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EFFECTS OF PROCESS VS. OUTCOME ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY,
AND IDENTIFIABILITY ON SOLUTION QUALITY
Megan Potter, MA
University o f Nebraska, 1998
Advisor: Dr. Lisa L. Scherer
This study investigated the effect o f accountability, responsibility, and identifiability
on the quality o f solutions generated to an ill-defined problem. Accountable participants
provided written justification for their output, either the solution generation process
(process accountability) or the solution generation outcome (outcome accountability).
Participants perceived themselves as either sharing responsibility for solution generation
with others (shared responsibility) or solely responsible for solution generation (sole
responsibility). Lastly, participants were either identifiable, such that their responses
could be traced to them personally, or anonymous. Solution quality was measured by
resolving power, or the degree to which a solution resolves conflicting aspects o f the
problem. All participants were asked to read an ill-defined problem, generate as many
/

solutions as possible to the problem, and choose the solution they felt was best. No
predictions were supported and a number o f unexpected findings occurred.
Unaccountable and outcome accountability participants each generated higher quality
best solutions than participants in the process accountability conditions. Participants who
shared responsibility generated a higher number of resolving alternatives and a greater
proportion o f resolving alternatives than participants who were solely responsible for
solution generation. Lastly, an interaction between identifiability and accountability was

discovered for the proportion o f resolving alternatives. Post-hoc comparisons revealed
that highly identifiable but unaccountable participants generated a higher proportion of
resolving solutions than highly identifiable participants in either outcome or process
accountability conditions. Implications for individual and group problem solving and
suggestions for future research are discussed.
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1

Effects of Process vs. Outcome Accountability, Responsibility,
and Identifiability on Solution Quality
Overview of the Problem
In every day life and in organizational contexts, people are faced with the task of
solving problems, many of which are accompanied by uncertainty and hesitation because
they have no one correct answer. These types of problems can be labeled as “ill-defined”
because it is often not perfectly clear exactly what the problem is or what routes or
measures should be taken to arrive at high quality solutions (Abelson & Levi, 1985).
Much research has been devoted to this common problem and has attempted to determine
how to maximize the quality of the final decision for ill-defined problems. This line of
research has taken several approaches to achieving this goal by focusing on the different
stages or phases of the problem solving process that individuals go through to arrive at a
final solution. A review hy Abelson and Levi (1985) describes four basic stages of illdefined problem solving as problem recognition, alternative generation, alternative
evaluation, and alternative selection. Essentially, these steps involve identifying the
existence o f a problem, generating possible solutions or alternatives, evaluating these
solutions, and ultimately choosing the solution which is perceived to be the best alternative
and implementing it. Research by Herek, Janis, and Huth (1987) has demonstrated the
importance and benefit of focusing attention on each of these stages. Herek et al.
determined that high quality decision making procedures are often associated with better
outcomes. Their analysis of 19 international crises led to the suggestion that vigilant
problem solvers who carefully attend to the appropriate steps will more likely (although
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not always) end up with a better outcome. However, despite the importance of the quality
o f all phases, little research has focused on the solution generation phase o f the problem
solving process for ill defined problems. It is important that this stage be addressed
because lack o f attention to this stage or any other is likely to cause the overall decision
quality to suffer.
Several approaches have been used to identify important influences on solution
generation. One approach has attempted to identify stable qualities of problem solvers that
influence solution generation. This individual difference perspective has primarily focused
on individual qualities, such as expertise, that affect a person’s ability to generate high
quality solutions. For example, it has been shown that individuals who are considered
experts in a given domain tend to be better at developing good solutions for problems in
that domain (Butler, 1995).
Another research approach has aimed at improving the problem solver’s ability to
generate solutions by providing them with decision aids. Problem structuring techniques
are decision aids which attempt to guide the development o f better solutions. For example,
Pitz, Sachs, and Heerboth (1980) found that structuring a problem by having participants
generate solutions to problem objectives presented one at a time led to a higher quantity of
solutions generated (compared to structuring the problem by presenting all objectives
simultaneously, presenting examples of solutions, or providing no structure). Scherer and
Billings (1986) farther revealed that the way in which problem objectives are presented
(e.g., in conflicting pairs, congruent pairs, or individually) can influence the quality of
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solutions generated. It should be noted that the goal of the above approaches focuses on
the problem solver’s ability to generate solutions.
Another perspective for understanding and predicting solution generation emphasizes
a problem solving motivation or willingness to work hard at coming up with good
solutions. There may be individual differences in such motivation, such as need for

cognition, for example. Some individuals prefer to engage in complex thinking, whereas
others would prefer to engage in tasks which require little thought (Cacioppo & Petty,
1981). It is also possible that motivators outside of the individual can function to increase
an individual’s willingness to exert effort. For example, individuals working on a very
important problem or decision for which they are responsible and accountable may feel
motivated to work harder. The assumption is that increased motivation will lead to
increased effort, which will ultimately lead to more high quality solutions.
It should be noted that none of the above means of improving problem solving is
necessarily better than another. Furthermore, they should not be thought of as entirely
independent of one another, as it would be possible to use them in conjunction with one
another. However, motivational influences on effort can be used for all individuals and for
all types of problems. For example, they do not require knowledge of the particular
objectives of the problem and can therefore be applied in a multitude of situations.
A host of variables has been suggested to influence cognitive effort, including
decision significance, irreversibility, and consequentially. In addition, making the decision
maker or problem solver identifiable, accountable, or responsible has been shown to affect
cognitive effort. Early research by McAllister, Mitchell, and Beach (1979) showed that
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when decisions are significant and cannot be reversed, and when the decision maker is
responsible for his actions, greater effort is invested in the decision. This increased effort
results in the use o f more analytic decision strategies. Hagafors and Brehmer (1983) found
that having to justify a judgment can lead to greater consistency in judgment policy.
Weldon and Gargano (1988) also found that people who were accountable, or expected to
justify their judgments, and solely responsible for their responses used more complex
judgment strategies. Past research has shown that when individual efforts are identifiable,
this identifiability leads to an increase in various types o f efforts (Latane, Williams, &
Harkins, 1979; Williams, Harkins, & Latane, 1981), but only one has been within the
problem solution generation domain. Scherer (1985) showed that people whose responses
were identifiable tended to generate more high quality solutions than those whose
responses were not identifiable.
For all of the above motivational influences, there is a common goal to increase the
willingness of individuals to exert more effort, presumably in order to improve
performance. However, much o f the effects o f accountability, responsibility, and
identifiability as motivational influences have been obscured because o f the lack of
consistency and clarity with which the research has been conducted.
While neither label is necessarily more correct, accountability and responsibility have
sometimes been used interchangeably in the literature, and their operationalization often
varies from study to study. With respect to accountability, common language tends to
define it as liability or responsibility (McKechnie, 1983). However, the bulk o f empirical
work on this variable has tended to refer to it as having to provide as account for, or
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justify, one’s views or actions (Tetlock, 1985b). Research on the effects of this definition
o f accountability on impression formation tasks, expression of opinions or attitudes, and
various judgments and decision tasks has shown evidence o f both its enhancing and
debilitating effects. These effects often depend on the task, the person to whom the
individual is accountable, and other situation characteristics. Essentially, the effects of
being accountable, or having to justify one’s views, are not clear cut or straight forward.
Other research has operationalized accountability in a manner which is somewhat
more consistent with every day use of the term. This research has manipulated
accountability by making participants solely responsible for their decisions, versus sharing
responsibility for decisions with others. This type of manipulation is obviously different
from requiring participants to justify their responses to another individual. One can
imagine the processes as being somewhat different in nature because accountability with
justification implies being able to defend a decision, whereas responsibility implies an
additional component of ownership o f outcomes. In fact, this same manipulation,
involving the assignment o f sole versus shared responsibility, is often the procedure used
in studies of the effects of responsibility. In situations involving this type of manipulation,
the degree of perceived ownership of outcomes is likely to be reduced when responsibility
is shared among individuals. In this way, it serves as a useful means o f varying
responsibility. However, another important component o f responsibility is the importance
o f the outcomes to the individual and to others. Tn order to induce a heightened sense of
responsibility, it is important that the decision task, the decision outcomes, and the
consequences of the outcomes be important to the decision maker. Whereas it might be
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argued that decision significance and consequentially are factors independent of
responsibility, it is argued here that in real life decisions, these factors are often consistent
with and determinants of the degree o f responsibility an individual tends to perceive. It is
therefore important that the operationalization of responsibility involve a problem or
decision whose consequences are perceived as both real and important to the individual.
In addition to the definitional and operational inconsistencies found in the study of
accountability and responsibility, both variables have often been confounded with
identifiability, which is known to have its own effects, independent o f accountability and
responsibility. Participants who are not accountable or share responsibility are often
unidentifiable, making conclusions regarding the independent effects o f any of these
variables difficult to draw. In sum, the inconsistency in research on accountability,
responsibility, and identifiability makes it difficult to determine a clear pattern of results.
Furthermore, with the exception of Scherer’s (1985) previously mentioned identifiability
study, no studies have examined the effects o f these motivational influences on the
solution generation stage for ill-defined problems. It is for these reasons that the primary
goal o f this study was to examine the effects of accountability, responsibility, and
identifiability on the generation of solutions to ill-defined problems.
A second problem appears to be inherent to past research on accountability. In most
cases, participants have been only vaguely informed of exactly what they are accountable
for, or exactly what they will have to justify. They are never told exactly what the
researcher is measuring. Whereas it is often the case that informing participants about
what will be measured will defeat the purpose of the study, this may not always be the
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case for accountability. Participants must be clear about what they will have to justify.
Consider a real life situation in which better performance of a particular task is desired. If
accountability were the chosen means o f improving such performance, one would make
the performer accountable for the specific performance level that is desired. In other
words, the desired result should be quite clear, and that is what the performer should be
accountable for. Consider a more specific example in which higher quality solutions to illdefined problems are desired. In order to use accountability to enhance such performance,
the problem solver should be made accountable specifically for higher quality solutions.
In some cases, however, making individuals accountable simply for the end product
is not the best means to arrive at an improved end product. Many times it is the process by
which one arrives at the end product which is most important. In these cases,
accountability must be directed toward the process itself. The importance of process in
problem solving is evidenced by the previously mentioned benefits of problem structuring
(Pitz et al., 1980; Scherer & Billings, 1986). When attention was directed to the problem
solving process through problem structuring, the outcome was more high quality
solutions. Research by Herek et al.(1987) has also shown a relationship between high
quality decision making procedures and favorable outcomes. They found that when
outcomes were not favorable, they were associated with incomplete use of available
information. So whereas one part o f the process, information search, was satisfactory,
another part o f the process, information utilization, was inadequate. Although causal
conclusions cannot be made from this study, the results do suggest that poor problem
solving procedures may lead to poor outcomes in some cases. Given these studies which
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support a relationship between process and outcome for problem solving, it appears that
motivational attempts to enhance the process may ultimately enhance the outcomes which
follow. It was therefore a secondary goal of this study to examine the influence of
accountability for the process versus accountability for the outcome on solution generation
for ill-defined problems.
The discussion which follows begins with a review of the one other study which has
thus far also recognized a potential distinction between process accountability and
outcome accountability. Subsequent discussion will review the literature on accountability
studies in which participants were accountable for some type o f outcome or end result.
These participants were not accountable for any of the processes by which they arrived at
the outcomes, but only for the outcomes, which tended to vary from study to study. The
review will address the formation of impressions, the expression o f opinions and attitudes,
and a variety of judgments and decisions. Next, a similar format will be followed in
addressing research reflecting the effects of accountability for a process. It is important to
note that with the exception o f the first study mentioned above, past research has not
specifically addressed process versus outcome accountability. However, research has
differed in the extent to which the instructions lend themselves to a process interpretation
or to an outcome interpretation. Therefore, although most past research has not made any
mention o f a distinction between the two types of accountability, one will be made here.
In the one study that has thus far indicated the existence o f at least two types of
accountability, procedural and outcome accountability, Siegal-Jacobs and Yates (1996)
had participants make a probability judgment regarding the likelihood that an individual
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held a particular attitude, based on background information about the individual. Some of
the background information was in fact predictive, whereas some was not. Participants
were assigned to one of three accountability conditions: procedural, outcome, or no
accountability. Participants in the procedural accountability condition were told that an
interview would later be conducted to determine why and how certain information was
used to arrive at a probability judgment. Outcome accountability participants were told
that they would later be given feedback regarding the accuracy o f their judgment (true
values were known) and that the top five performers would receive a bonus prize for
accuracy. Lastly, unaccountable participants were told that their answers would be
anonymous and confidential. Multiple detailed dependent measures were assessed to
examine probability judgment accuracy. Only those that are relevant to the study’s results
will be addressed.
The authors hypothesized that procedural accountability would have more beneficial
effects on judgment performance than outcome accountability because there is less
pressure and stress associated with simply having to arrive at a justifiable procedure,
versus having to arrive at a justifiable outcome, the quality o f which may often vary due to
various uncertainties. Results showed that procedure accountability participants had
higher calibration, which means that they gave judgments that most closely resembled the
true probability, relative to outcome accountability and unaccountable participants. In
addition, they also had lower discrimination, meaning that, they tended to attempt to use
the nonpredictive information as well as the predictive information in making their
judgments. Lastly, outcome accountability was shown to have only negative effects,
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compared not only to procedural accountability but also to no accountability. Outcome
accountability resulted in greater scatter, an indication of the extent to which judgments
vary around their conditional means.
The authors suggested that outcome accountability may have produced more stress,
which then resulted in more inconsistent response patterns. Their results show that
accountability directed at the procedure can have beneficial effects, while accountability
for an outcome may have detrimental or negligible effects. More importantly, SiegalJacobs and Yates concluded that it is necessary that attention be drawn to the nature of
the accountability instructions and what participants are being held accountable for.
It is extremely important to note that although this study provides considerable
support for the notion that a distinction ought to be made between procedural and
outcome accountability, the operationalization of these two types of accountability is not
entirely consistent with "those used in the current study. Although the procedural
accountability is similar to that used here, the outcome accountability is very different. It
seems that Siegal-Jacobs and Yates’ operationalization of outcome accountability more
closely resembles that of the consequentially o f the judgment, an outcome which, as the
authors have pointed out, is likely to be very uncertain, since participants may have little
or no control over it. This study did not intend to examine outcome accountability in
conjunction with any of the consequences which follow. Instead, the overall distinction
between process and outcome accountability is yet more refined, and the study addresses
the difference between being accountable simply for arriving at a good problem solution
(outcome accountability) and being accountable for the process used to arrive at a good
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problem solution (process accountability). Whereas this refined distinction may not be
applicable in all types of situations where accountability is likely to be imposed, it is
believed to be particularly applicable to the problem solving domain, where attention to
the process of problem solving is likely to enhance the quality o f the outcome.
Outcome Accountability
In the following studies, participants were made accountable for the responses they
gave concerning their impressions of other individuals, their opinions and attitudes toward
controversial issues, and their judgments or decisions. Participants were not asked to be
able to explain which information they used to arrive at their responses, only that they be
able to describe why the solutions were good solutions.
Impression formation. In one of his earlier studies, Tetlock (1983b) examined the
influence of accountability on the perseverance of first impressions o f a fictitious
defendant’s guilt or innocence. Accountability was manipulated by informing participants
that they would either have to justify their impressions of the accused person’s guilt or
innocence to an associate of the experimenter or not. Previous research had shown the
tendency for initial impressions to strongly influence the interpretation o f later information
and subsequent impressions; this is known as the primacy effect. The study was conducted
to determine whether accountability would cause participants to be less susceptible to the
primacy effect. Tetlock thought that accountable participants would experience increased
motivation to attend to all the information and would he therefore less prone to the
primacy effect.
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Participants were told that they would read a description o f a court case and 18 brief
summaries of evidence about the case and give their impressions of the accused person’s
guilt or innocence. Accountable participants were also told that the study was concerned
with the “interpersonal communication of beliefs and attitudes.” Participants did not know
exactly what types of responses they would be asked to give, other than their impressions.
Accountability and order o f information were the independent variables. Order of
information was manipulated by the placement o f favorable and unfavorable information
about the defendant. The order o f evidence was varied such that participants either read
evidence in favor o f the defendant followed by evidence against the defendant or vice
versa. In the third condition evidence in favor of and against the defendant was randomly
alternated. The three accountability conditions included: (a) no accountability, (b) pre
exposure accountability, and (c) post-exposure accountability. Participants in the no
accountability conditioriwere told that their responses would be confidential and not
traceable to them personally. Participants in the other two conditions were told that they
“would later be asked to justify their impressions of the accused person’s guilt or
innocence to an associate of the experimenter.” The difference between the two
accountability conditions was the timing o f the instructions. In the pre-exposure
accountability condition, participants were informed of their accountability before reading
the information about the case. In the post-exposure condition, participants were informed
of their accountability after reading all the information.
Dependent variables included a rating from 0 to 100 of each participant’s impression
of the likelihood that the defendant committed the crime and their verdict of guilty or
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innocent. Participants were also asked to recall as much evidence from the case as
possible, and this recall was coded for the number of items that were pro- or anti
defendant.
Results showed a main effect for order of information such that participants who
read the evidence against the defendant first rated the defendant as more likely to be guilty
than participants who read this information last. The authors interpreted this as evidence
o f the primacy effect. There was no main effect of accountability on the likelihood o f the
defendant’s guilt. However, planned comparisons showed that pre-exposure accountability
participants (those told they would have to justify their impressions prior to reading the
evidence) did not demonstrate a primacy effect; that is, they were unaffected by the order
of information provided. In addition, these participants showed better recall, remembering
significantly more evidence (both pro- and anti-defendant) than unaccountable participants
and participants informed of their accountability after reading the evidence. There were no
effects for the dichotomous judgment of guilt or innocence.
The author suggested that accountability eliminated the primacy effect in pre
exposure conditions by affecting participants’ encoding and processing, not by enhancing
their recall. If accountability simply led to greater recall, this would have been shown in
post-exposure accountability conditions as well, but it was not. Based on the enhanced
recall of pre-exposure accountable participants, it was first suggested that these
participants encoded the material more elaborately and processed it more deeply than
post-exposure or unaccountable participants. However, the authors warned not to
conclude that it is the depth of processing which leads to elimination o f the primacy effect.
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Further analyses showed that when primacy effects did occur they were not mediated by
selective recall of evidence. In other words, it would not be accurate to conclude that
greater recall in the pre-exposure condition is evidence for deeper, more elaborate
processing, despite the fact that it is often a result o f deeper processing. It was instead
suggested that accountability may have interfered with the biased assimilation o f later
evidence into initial impressions. That is, participants may have been more careful about
the conclusions they jumped to or more open to information revealed subsequent to their
first impressions.
The following research addresses the role o f accountability as a potential means of
somehow motivating individuals to be more accurate in the formation o f impressions of
other people. More specifically, it addresses the role o f accountability in motivating
greater cognitive effort to reduce a common person perception error, known as the
fundamental attribution error. It should be noted that an investigation o f the effects of
accountability on common judgmental biases, such as the fundamental attribution error,
can reveal whether these biases are the result o f a lack of ability or a lack o f motivation
and effort.
Tetlock (1985a) examined the effects of accountability on the attributions individuals
made for a writer, based on a sample of the writer’s work. Accountability was
manipulated by informing participants that they would have to justify their impressions of
the writer to an associate of the experimenter. Previous research had demonstrated the
tendency for people to make internal attributions for others’ behavior, despite the
existence of potential external causes; this has been labeled the fundamental attribution
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error. Tetlock hypothesized that accountability would serve to prevent faulty attributions
in one o f two ways. One way would be by motivating individuals to increase the amount
o f cognitive effort and carefulness allocated to the judgment task. A second process by
which accountability might reduce faulty attributions is by leading people to be more
cautious about what attributions they are willing to express and attempt to justify.
Participants read an essay on minority quota systems in college admissions and
answered a series of questions regarding their impressions o f the writer and their
confidence of those impressions. Accountability, the direction of the essay (pro- or anti
affirmative action) and the degree o f writer choice were the independent variables.
Accountable participants were told that they would later be asked to justify their
impressions of the writer to an associate of the experimenter, who was interested in the
"person-perception process.’ These participants were informed either before reading the
essay (pre-exposure accountability) or after reading the essay (post-exposure
accountability). The manipulation o f the timing of the accountability instructions was done
to test the two previously mentioned possible effects of accountability. If accountability
were to operate by causing participants to devote greater cognitive effort to the task, then
pre-exposure accountability would have an effect, whereas post-exposure accountability
would not, because the task would already be completed. However, if accountability were
to operate by simply altering the attributions people are willing to express, then both preand post-exposure accountability would show effects on the attributions participants
make. Again, participants who were not accountable were told that their responses were
confidential. Before reading the essay, participants were told that the writer had either
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chosen (high-choice condition) or been assigned (low-choice condition) his position on the
issue. The essays either supported or opposed affirmative action. The dependent measures
included participants’ estimations o f the writer’s attitudes about the essay topic and other
similar issues. Responses to all questions were given on a 21-point rating scale.
Evidence for the overattribution effect was found, such that participants’ impressions
o f the writer’s attitudes corresponded to the direction of the essay, whether the writer was
believed to have chosen or not chosen the direction of the essay. However, pre-exposure
accountability was found to moderate the overattribution effect; these participants were
less likely to make extreme attitude attributions to the low-choice writer. It was suggested
that this was not due simply to changes in what participants were willing to say because
post-exposure accountability participants’ responses were almost as strong as those made
by unaccountable participants. If accountability acted to make participants more cautious
about what they were willing to say, then responses from both pre- and post- exposure
participants should be equally moderate. Instead, the responses of post-exposure
participants were no less extreme than those o f participants who were not accountable.
In addition, no significant differences in attributions were found across conditions for
the high-choice writer. In other words, the extremity of attributions for the high-choice
writer was equal across accountability conditions. This also argues against the possibility
that accountability operates by altering the responses people are willing to express,
otherwise this effect would have been evident in the high-choice condition as well
Analysis of participants’ confidence in their attributions yielded a significant writer
choice X accountability interaction. Pre-exposure accountability led to lower confidence
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relative to both unaccountability and post-exposure accountability. These results were
consistent with those of the previously reported study, and the author’s interpretations
were similar.
Because of the different effects for pre- and post-exposure accountability, Tetlock
concluded that the mechanism by which accountability altered attributions was by placing
participants in a more analytic and vigilant mental set and serving to prevent, rather than
reverse, the common judgmental bias. This prevention is thought to occur because
individuals engage in what he calls “pre-emptive self-criticism,” in which they imagine
possible deficiencies in their position and also possible positive aspects of alternate
positions. This can be regarded as a result of increased cognitive effort, rather than
increased motivation to express the most justifiable attribution.
A study by Rozelle and Baxter (1981) examined the effects o f both accountability
and responsibility on participants’ perceptions of target individuals’ characteristics after
watching a videotape o f the target in a mock interview. The question addressed in this
study was whether accountability and responsibility would serve to reduce errors in person
perception. Previous research had found that one person’s descriptions of a target
person’s characteristics are more likely to be a function of the perceiver than the
perceived; this is evidenced by low agreement across different perceivers of the same
target (low inteijudge agreement) and high agreement within a perceiver across different
targets (high intrajudge agreement). It was expected that accountability and responsibility
would reduce this biased tendency by placing demands on the perceiver which would lead
to more differentiated descriptions across targets (lower intrajudge agreement) and greater
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consistency across judges for a given target (higher inteijudge agreement). Accountability
was defined as having to provide an explanation for or more information about target
descriptions, versus being virtually anonymous. Responsibility was defined as having to
give target descriptions that would be used for a real decision, versus being used for
research purposes.
Participants watched two videos of interviews o f graduate school applicants and
completed a checklist of descriptive characteristics of the applicant. The checklist included
bipolar adjectives, as well as a ‘neither’ response for each set of descriptors. Then they
were asked to generate five more psychological characteristics on their own which would
describe the target, as well as an adjective that would be considered the opposite.
Accountability was manipulated by informing participants that they would later have to
discuss their ratings of their perceptions o f the target with the psychology department
selection committee in order to provide the committee with more information. They were
also told that applicants had access to their ratings and tended to take the opportunity to
view them. Unaccountable participants were told that the ratings would be kept in strict
confidence. It is important to note that the accountability instructions in this case did not
mention that justification per se would be required, only that they may be asked to share
more information. The degree o f responsibility was varied such that participants thought
their responses would either be used to make a real decision about the current applicant or
not. High responsibility was induced by telling participants that their ratings would be
considered along with other information in reaching a decision about the applicant. In the
low responsibility condition, participants were informed that the decision had already been
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made and that their ratings would be used as an aid to improve the future selection
process.
Both the checklist responses and the participant-generated characteristics were used
to determine the intra- and inter-judge agreement. Responses were considered to agree if
they were in the same direction. There were 30 videotapes altogether and they were
randomly paired and shown to two participants each. In this way, each participant saw
two videos and each video was seen by two participants. This gave the researchers an
opportunity to examine both intrajudge agreement across two targets and inteijudge
agreement for one target.
Consistent with predictions, high accountability and responsibility produced greater
inteijudge agreement and lower intrajudge agreement. More specifically, reliable and
discriminating target descriptions were found for high accountability participants under
both conditions o f responsibility. The authors suggested that accountability, as an
evaluation pressure, seemed to affect attentional processes, causing participants to pay
more careful attention to the characteristics of the target. It should be noted that when
accountability was low, high responsibility did lead to more accurate responses than when
responsibility was low, but results for these conditions (low accountability-high
responsibility and low accountability-low responsibility) were not significant. Thus, while
results were strongest in the condition where both accountability and responsibility were
high, responsibility itself did not appear to be as strong an influence relative to
accountability. These results suggest that accountability and, to a lesser extent,
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responsibility serve to increase attentional efforts, making target descriptions more
accurate and reflective of the target, rather than the perceiver.
Opinion and attitude expression. The next two studies investigated the effects of
accountability on the expression o f attitudes or opinions regarding controversial issues.
Specifically, Tetlock (1983a) examined the effect of accountability on the complexity of
people’s thinking about controversial issues. Accountability was manipulated by informing
participants that they would later have to justify their attitudes on several issues to another
participant. Two alternate hypotheses regarding the effect that accountability has on the
way people respond to having to express their opinions or attitudes were tested. It was
suggested that accountability may motivate individuals to process information in a more
complex and effortful manner, possibly as a means to prevent themselves from appearing
to lack good judgment. This increased complexity of thought would be accompanied by
the adoption of more moderate views, in order to reduce the possibility o f sharp
disagreement. Alternatively, being required to justify a point o f view could lead individuals
to adopt the viewpoint which they believe would be viewed most favorably or would be
most easily justified. This would require, of course, that the individual be aware of what
position would be regarded as most favorable. In this case, accountability would not lead
to more effortful thinking about the issues, but rather to the low-effort strategy of simply
expressing the most easily justified response.
In a test of these hypotheses, participants were asked to spend five minutes writing
down their thoughts on the issues o f affirmative action, defense spending, and capital
punishment and then respond to several attitude measures. These measures were three 7-
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point semantic differential scales to measure the participants’ attitudes toward the issues.
The anchors were fair-unfair, good-bad, and wise-foolish. Accountability was the only
independent variable, and there were four conditions. In three of the conditions,
participants were accountable; that is, they expected to justify the positions they took on
the attitude response scales to another participant. In one of these conditions, no other
information about the individual to whom the participant would be accountable was given.
In the other two conditions, the participants were told that the individual to whom they
were accountable held either liberal or conservative views toward major social issues.
Note that participants expected to justify only their responses to the attitude scales, not
their reported thoughts; these were thought to be confidential and not traceable to them
personally. In the fourth condition, participants were not accountable and they believed all
of their responses would be confidential and not traceable to them personally.
The thoughts reported by participants were analyzed in terms of integrative
complexity, which is a measure o f the number o f dimensions of a problem considered
(labeled as differentiation) and the amount o f connections made between these dimensions
(labeled as integration). It is important to note that the degree of integrative complexity is
not a reflection o f the particular position an individual chooses to take, but rather the
structure of the views. In addition, these thoughts were coded as liberal, conservative, or
neutral. These codings were used to develop two additional measures, a difference balance
index and a ratio balance index. The difference index was the difference between the
number of liberal and conservative thoughts for each participant. The ratio index was the
ratio of the number of either liberal or conservative thoughts (whichever was more) to the
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total number of thoughts listed. For the difference index, scores close to zero reflected
high inconsistency in thoughts; for the ratio index, scores close to one indicated high
consistency in thoughts. Responses to the attitude scales were used as a dependent
measure and an additional measure was calculated from the attitude scales to assess the
extremity o f attitudes. This was done to address the possibility that accountability causes
people to take less extreme stances.
Analyses showed that participants who were accountable to an individual of known
views (a liberal or a conservative) tended to report thoughts and attitudes consistent with
the individual to whom they believed they were accountable. Contrary to predictions,
participants accountable to an unknown individual did not report less extreme views than
unaccountable participants. Although unexpected at the time, these results are consistent
with what has since been learned about accountability. As previously mentioned (Tetlock,
1985a), accountability does not appear to alter the views people are willing to express, as
evidenced by the difference between pre- and post-exposure responses. If it were to
operate in this manner; there should be similar responses to accountability demands,
regardless of when the individual was informed of these demands. Again, this is supportive
of the suggestion that accountability affects how and what people think and not simply
what they are willing to say. Other results showed that participants who were accountable
to an individual o f unknown views were found to think in significantly more integratively
complex ways than participants in all of the other conditions, as indicated by higher ratings
for level of integrative complexity. T hese accountable participants also had significantly
lower scores on the difference balance index and on the ratio balance index than
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participants in all other conditions. Both of these results indicate greater inconsistency in
thoughts.
The contribution of this study is that whereas accountability may lead to increased
complexity o f thinking in some cases, it may lead to less effortful thinking in others. More
specifically, if people know the views o f the individual to whom they are accountable, they
are likely to respond with less effort, by expressing views which they believe will be seen
as most favorable. However, when it is not clear what responses are most favorable,
participants will respond by thinking in a more complex manner by evaluating the issue in
a more inconsistent and multidimensional manner.
A second study by Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger (1989) replicated and expanded
upon the previous study. In addition to varying the individual to whom the participant was
believed to be accountable, the authors also varied the timing of the attitude measures.
Whereas in the previous"'study the attitude measures were always given after participants
reported their thoughts on the controversial issues, this study included an additional
condition in which the attitude measures were completed before the thoughts were written
down. It was predicted that participants in this condition would react to accountability
demands by becoming defensive about their previously reported attitudes, since they
would have already committed themselves to a position. Therefore, integrative complexity
should be low, because participants would attempt to maintain consistency in their
reported thoughts as a means o f bolstering their position. Recall that consistency would
represent low differentiation, which is a sign oflow integrative complexity.
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Again participants were asked to list their thoughts and feelings on the issues of
affirmative action, university tuition, nuclear freeze, and capital punishment and to
complete a series of attitude scales on the same issues. The scales used were the same as
those of the previous study, which included three 7-point semantic differential items which
measured each participant's attitudes toward each policy. Half of the participants reported
their thoughts first and then completed the attitude measures, the other half did these tasks
in reverse order. It is important to make clear that all participants, regardless of which task
they completed first, were informed of their level of accountability prior to the first task.
Therefore, the timing of the accountability instructions was not manipulated. Participants
were assigned to one of four conditions of accountability. These were identical to those of
the previous study; accountable participants expected to justify their responses to the
attitude measures to another participant who was either a liberal, a conservative, or an
individual whose views were unknown. Again, note that no participant thought they would
be accountable for their thoughts. Accountability was imposed only for the attitude
responses. In the fourth condition, participants were not accountable and believed all of
their responses were confidential and not traceable to them personally.
The reported thoughts were again analyzed for integrative complexity and results
were consistent with those o f the previous study, for those variables that were repeated. In
other words, those participants who were accountable to an individual of unknown views
tended to think in significantly more integratively complex ways than participants in the
other three conditions of accountability. Also, participants who were accountable to an
individual of known views tended to report attitudes consistent with these views.
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However, both o f these results were found only for participants who reported their
thoughts first and then completed the attitude measures. Participants who took an
attitudinal stand first tended to respond by bolstering and becoming more committed to
their attitudes. This was the case regardless o f whether the participant was accountable to
a liberal, a conservative, or an individual o f unknown views. In other words, having
committed themselves to particular attitudes, participants did not respond to
accountability demands by adopting the viewpoints which would be seen as most
favorable. Instead, they became even more committed to their original stand. These results
provided evidence of yet another means o f responding to accountability demands.
Judgments and decisions. The last and more pertinent domain o f outcome
accountability has been concerned with judgments and decisions. Adelberg and Batson
(1978) examined the effects of accountability on the decision to engage in helping
behavior. Participants were given information about six financial aid applicants and asked
to make allocation decisions. Accountability and adequacy o f resources were varied across
participants. Accountable participants thought they would be meeting with a staff member
involved with the project to review their performance or with the applicant to inform them
of the allocation decision. Resources were either adequate to meet the needs o f all six
applicants or inadequate, such that not everyone’s needs would be met. The measure of
interest was the allocation effectiveness, which assessed the degree to which effective uses
of the resources were made. An effective allocation was made if enough money was given
to an individual to meet their predetermined need. An ineffective allocation was made if
the amount of money awarded was insufficient to meet an individual’s need. This was
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considered ineffective because without assistance to meet their survival needs, students
would be forced to drop out o f school. Therefore, the help would be ineffective overall.
Results showed that when resources were inadequate, accountability led to more
ineffective allocation of resources. That is, more money was wasted by allocating an
insufficient amount to many individuals, instead of allocating a sufficient amount to only a
few individuals. Here accountability for a decision outcome obviously did not lead to a
more desirable outcome. It may be, however, that accountability for the process by which
the decision strategies were made may have produced more desirable outcomes. Analysis
of the strategies used to make allocation decisions revealed that only the unaccountable
participants responded with the most efficient allocation strategy, presumably because they
were not accountable for the outcome. Although it may not immediately follow, it is
possible that shifting the accountability away from the outcome and towards the process
may have led to a more'effective process and a more favorable outcome.
In both situations, accountability presumably led to apprehension associated with
having to justify a response. However, the responses were very different across these
studies because of the different nature o f the tasks. In the studies involving impressions
and opinions, participants simply had to argue for what they thought. As long as it could
be seen as defensible, it shouldn’t have mattered what they thought since their opinions
and impressions did not have any effect on others. Here the response, or decision, of the
participant was very important to the individual to whom the participant was accountable.
The financial aid decision could potentially alter the recipient’s life in a drastic way. It
could be argued that a high degree of responsibility was operating to influence
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participants’ reactions to the accountability demands. According to these results,
accountability may have the potential to place too much pressure on an individual, causing
him or her to act in less than effective ways.
A study by Hagafors and Brehmer (1983) examined the effect of accountability on
the degree of consistency in judgments in a multiple cue probability learning task. In this
type of task, participants are to learn to use a set of cues to make judgments. This requires
determining the relationship between the cues and a criterion, and then applying this to
predict the criterion from the cue. Learning should take place because feedback is given
regarding the accuracy of judgments. It was hypothesized that participants who would be
required to justify their judgments would make these judgments with greater consistency
than those participants not required to justify their judgments, because applying greater
consistency would make justification easier for these participants.
Participants were given cue values (from 1 to 15) which represented the amount of a
fictitious substance in a patient’s body. They were then asked to predict the criterion
(values ranging from 1 to 50), which represented the severity of disease. The researchers
manipulated outcome predictability (low vs. high), feedback (present vs. absent), and
accountability (accountable vs. unaccountable). The presence of feedback included
informing participants of the true criterion value following prediction. When feedback was
absent, no information was given about the correct answer. The accountability
manipulation required participants to explain in writing why they chose each particular
level of criterion. It should be noted that participants actually followed through with the
justification, whereas in other studies participants only expected to later justify themselves,
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but never had to do so. The primary dependent variable of interest was the consistency of
the individual’s judgments, which was represented by the multiple correlation between the
cues and the participant’s predictions.
Analyses revealed a three-way interaction which showed that accountability led to
greater consistency in judgment across trials, but only in conditions of no feedback and
low outcome predictability. The authors suggested that the need to justify affected only
the low predictability participants because consistency would already be high among the
high predictability participants, regardless of accountability. In other words, for the high
predictability conditions, there was no room for accountability to have an effect, because
consistency was already so high. They also explained that accountability would not lead to
greater consistency for participants receiving feedback because the feedback would cause
them to persist in applying new rules, or testing hypotheses about the relationship between
the cue and criterion. Without feedback, once a rule was chosen, it would be applied
consistently. For these reasons, the power of accountability to increase the consistency of
judgments was limited to those conditions in which outcome predictability was low and
there was no feedback.
Schadewald and Limberg (1992) also studied the effects accountability on judgments,
except in this case they were judgments regarding the strength of legal arguments. It was
hypothesized based on previous research that participants who heard an argument which
followed a natural order of progression and causality would judge that argument to be
stronger than one which was not presented in such fashion, simply because the former
would be more easily understood and mentally constructed. However, it was thought that
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accountability would moderate this effect and cause participants to be less susceptible to
the effects of the information order. This pressure to be accountable would cause
participants to focus more on the facts presented in the argument, instead o f just on the
sequence of the events.
Participants were presented with one of two tax cases; one described an individual’s
intentions regarding forming a partnership and the other described intentions for operating
a kennel. The applicable tax laws were provided and two arguments were given, one
which argued that the requisite intent existed (affirmative argument) and one which argued
that it did not exist (negative argument). Participants read the arguments and rated the
relative strength o f the arguments on a 21-point scale, and then gave a dichotomous
decision about which one was stronger. All participants received competing arguments
regarding intent, and the order in which the affirmative and negative arguments was
presented was counterbalanced across all participants. However, the order in which the
information was presented within the arguments was varied. The facts within the
arguments were presented either in a causal order or random order. High accountability
was induced by having participants justify their judgments of the strength o f the argument
in writing. No justification was required o f or mentioned to participants who were not
accountable. In sum, the tax case, information order, and accountability were the
independent variables.
Results showed that accountability reduced the typical response o f choosing the
argument in which the facts were presented in causal order as the stronger argument. In
conditions o f low accountability, information order was found to have an effect on
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judgment, such that the causal order was seen as stronger than the random order. When
accountability was high, this effect was no longer present. In other words, neither the
causal nor the random order of events was seen as a significantly stronger argument than
the other. A postexperimental questionnaire revealed that participants found those
arguments presented in causal order to be more coherent and easier to understand. This
supported the previously mentioned logic that participants would find a causal order of
events easier to understand. The authors concluded simply that requiring participants to be
accountable reduces the likelihood that they will be susceptible to thinking that a causally
ordered argument is easier to follow, and therefore stronger.
Recently, Murphy (1994) examined the effect of accountability on covariation
judgments. These judgments were somewhat similar to those required o f participants that
judged the criterion o f disease from cues, a study discussed earlier (Hagafors &
Brehmer,1983). However, in this study, the task was different, and it allowed for the
researchers to examine the strategies used in the judgments. It had been shown in previous
work that participants performing covariation tasks tended to use very simple strategies,
resulting in poor assessments. Based on the promising results o f much of the work already
cited, Murphy speculated that accountability might spur participants to use more complex
strategies in their covariation assessments, if indeed additional effort was all that was
required.
Participants were given 12 problems, each o f which gave values for two crossed
variables, presented in a 2 X 2 table. The values presented in each of the four cells
represented the relationship between a fertilizer and the health of a plant. Therefore,
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fertilizer vs. no fertilizer was crossed with healthy vs. unhealthy. Based on these cell
values, participants responded to a question regarding the degree of covariation
demonstrated in each o f the problems. The question required the participant to use the
given values to rate on a 7-point scale whether the plants which received the fertilizer
would be healthier than, less healthy than, or as healthy as plants which did not receive the
fertilizer. Only the direction, not the actual value, of the rating was used to determine
accuracy. Accountable participants were told that they would later be asked to justify their
judgments (ratings) to the experimenter and that other participants would also ask them
questions. There was no mention o f accountability to the rest of the participants.
The problems were differently structured, and were divided accordingly into four
groups, depending on the particular strategy that was required to correctly solve them. In
this way, the number and type o f problems solved served as an indicator o f the specific
decision strategies used. For example, if a participant were to correctly solve all o f the
problems, it could be concluded that a decision strategy called the conditional probability
rule had been applied (since it was required to solve the most complex group of
problems). It was found that accountable participants showed more complex patterns in
strategy employment than unaccountable participants. The author concluded that previous
findings which showed that participants did not apply complex strategies in
covariation assessment were not the result of an inability to do so. Accountability demands
resulted in the use of more complex decision strategies.
As can be seen from the above studies, a great deal of support has been generated for
the proposition that accountability can, under certain circumstances, lead to enhanced
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cognitive processing. The above studies generally required that participants simply justify
their responses, whether these consisted o f impressions, opinions, attitudes, decisions, or
judgments. Once again, these instructions are most consistent with the notion of
accountability for an.outcome^ although. they were not labeled as such. Now the focus will
turn to studies in which the accountability instructions were directed slightly more towards
a process justification.
Process Accountability
Impression formation. Two studies investigated the effects o f accountability for
information used to form impressions o f others on thought complexity and accuracy of
impressions. Tetlock and Kim (1987) demonstrated that in the absence of accountability
demands, participants are quick to draw conclusions about the personality of others, tend
to base these impressions on limited information, and are overly confident in their
predictions. The authors suggested, however, that accountability might once again serve
to reduce these types of biases in a personality prediction task by causing participants to
think in more integratively complex ways, thereby improving the accuracy of their
impressions.
Participants read three individuals’ responses to a 16-item personality test and then
gave a short personality sketch (descriptions of at least three sentences in writing) o f each
person. Then they were asked to predict the other individuals’ responses to an additional
set of personality items and rate their confidence in the correctness of each prediction.
Participants were told that the study was concerned with the person-perception process,
defined as the way people use various types of information to form impressions of others.
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Accountable participants were told that they would be involved in a detailed interview
with the experimenter to investigate “the types o f information people use to form
impressions o f others.” In addition, the interview would be audiotaped for future analysis.
Accountability instructions were given either before or after participants had read the testtakers’ responses and written the personality sketch. Unaccountable participants were told
that their impressions would be completely confidential and not traceable to them. The
written personality sketches were coded by raters for integrative complexity, a measure of
the degree o f differentiation and integration of concepts. The predictive accuracy o f the
item responses and the appropriateness of confidence ratings were also analyzed, both
through the use of detailed statistical analyses.
Consistent with previous research, preexposure-accountability led to more
integratively complex and accurate descriptions along with lowered confidence (which
was more appropriate) in their predictions. However, the accuracy and confidence effects
were found to still be significant even after controlling for integrative complexity.
Therefore, accountability appears to have some effect on accuracy and confidence
independent o f its effects on complexity o f thought. Tetlock and Kim suggested that
accountability may not only lead to more analytic thought but may also serve as a “social
brake on judgmental biases.” As a means of doing this, accountability may cause
individuals to respond in a manner which disrupts automatic processing. However, it can
only do this when participants are informed o f their accountability before being exposed to
the information that would normally be processed more automatically. This explains why
postexposure-accountable participants reacted no differently than unaccountable
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participants. Individuals informed of their accountability after automatic processing only
have access to the products of their thoughts and therefore cannot correct the process.
Thus far, most of the research which has demonstrated that accountability leads to
increased complexity of thought has shown positive outcomes of such enhanced
processing. However, Tetlock and Boettger (1989) have shown that this effect of
accountability is not always desirable, especially in situations when the information that is
processed more integratively may not be relevant to the task at hand. Their study
investigated the influence o f accountability on the dilution effect for a person perception
task. The dilution effect is the tendency for nondiagnostic information to dilute the
extremity of predictions people make. In other words, when given information that is
diagnostic (useful to base predictions upon) and information that is nondiagnostic
(irrelevant to predictions), people normally tend to make predictions that are more
moderate than when only diagnostic information is given. It was speculated that
accountability would exacerbate this effect by causing participants to think in more
complex ways about all the information given, whether it was previously determined to be
relevant or not.
The following study consisted o f two experiments which were identical except for
the content o f the tasks. Participants in the first experiment reviewed a description o f a
student, and participants in the second experiment read a description o f a psychotherapy
patient. In both experiments, participants subsequently wrote their thoughts about their
impressions of the individuals, made a specific prediction about the individual (GPA for
the student and likelihood of being a child abuser for the patient), and rated their
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confidence in their prediction. The prediction for the patient required a rating on an 11point scale. It was not clear how many points were on the scale for the confidence ratings.
All participants were told that the study was concerned with person perception processes
and that experimenters would look at how people use information to form impressions and
how those impressions are used to make predictions. Accountable participants were told
prior to reading any information that they would be interviewed later so that the
researcher could “explore the types o f information used to form impressions of others.”
Unaccountable participants were told that their impressions would be confidential and not
traceable to them. In addition to accountability, the direction o f the diagnostic evidence
and the type o f evidence were manipulated. The direction o f evidence was varied by giving
participants information that either suggested the student would have a high GPA or a low
GPA and information that suggested that the patient was either a child abuser or was not.
The type of evidence was varied such that participants received either a small amount of
diagnostic information (control condition), diagnostic plus nondiagnostic information
(dilution condition), larger amounts o f diagnostic information (augmented condition), or a
mixture of diagnostic and counterdiagnostic information (contradictory condition).
Therefore, in both experiments, the variables of accountability, direction of evidence and
type of evidence were completely crossed. Integrative complexity, extremity of
predictions, and the appropriateness o f confidence ratings were the dependent measures.
Consistent with predictions, evidence o f the dilution effect was shown; participants
given nondiagnostic information in addition to diagnostic information (dilution condition)
tended to make less extreme predictions than control participants. In addition,
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accountability exacerbated the dilution effect, such that it was much stronger for
accountable participants than unaccountable participants. In other words, in the diluted
condition, participants who were accountable gave a predicted GPA closer to the average
GPA (participants were told to predict a GPA of 3.0 if they had no useful information on
which to base predictions) than unaccountable participants
A similar pattern was found for the second experiment; accountable participants in
the dilution condition predicted a likelihood o f being a child abuser that was closer to the
mean (a rating of 6, which represented no greater or less likelihood than anyone else) than
unaccountable participants. Relative to unaccountable participants, accountable
participants also made more extreme judgments in the augmented condition and less
extreme judgments in the contradictory condition. Consistent with previous research,
accountable participants were more integratively complex in their thinking and had
reduced confidence in their predictions relative to unaccountable participants, who tended
to be overconfident. Integrative complexity was found to be a significant covariate for the
accountable participants in the dilution condition, but the interaction was still significant
for the first experiment when complexity was partialed out.
Although this research has highlighted a negative outcome of accountability, it is not
inconsistent with previous conclusions about the effects o f accountability. Because the
strength o f the interaction was reduced by removing the effects of complexity, it is still
suggested that increased complexity o f thought is one o f the mechanisms through which
the dilution effect is exacerbated by accountability. The authors suggested that
accountable participants thought so complexly about the information that they made great
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efforts to make use of all the information, whether or not it was objectively described by
others as diagnostic. Remember that less extreme predictions were made by accountable
participants in the dilution condition, but more extreme predictions were made in the
augmented condition, where the information was useful to making predictions. Once
again, it was shown that accountability could not be operating to simply alter what people
are willing to say, since extremity of judgments varied as a function o f the types of
information available, not as a function of accountability.
Judgments and decisions. Consistent with the previous discussion of outcome
accountability, this last section concerning process accountability includes those studies in
which participants were asked to make a judgment or a decision. Early research by
McAllister, Mitchell, and Beach (1979) focused on people’s selection of decision
strategies and the effects o f accountability, decision significance, and decision reversibility
on such selection. The study was conducted to provide more information for a model
previously proposed by two o f the authors, Beach and Mitchell (1978). The model
accounts for strategy selection by applying a cost-benefit analysis to the selection process.
According to the model, the cost of using a strategy increases as the complexity of the
strategy increases. However, the possibility of arriving at a correct decision (a benefit) also
increases as the complexity o f the strategy increases. Therefore, in choosing which
decision strategy to use, the decision-maker is confronted with assessing these costs and
benefits. In addition, however, other outside factors can enter into the equation. Three
such factors are accountability, decision significance, and decision reversibility. No
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particular hypotheses were made regarding how these variables would affect decision
strategy selection.
Three studies were conducted, but the first two manipulated accountability in a
manner which would be more appropriately labeled here as responsibility. Participants
were asked to read descriptions of several organizational problems, assume the role of the
central character, and then choose a decision strategy from four decision strategies
outlined by the experimenter. In the second experiment, participants again chose a
decision strategy, but also had to employ the strategy and actually make a decision. In the
organizational problem, the central character was either personally responsible for the
decision or his decision would be reviewed by others. Because participants were supposed
to assume the role of the central character, this variation in the central character’s decision
responsibility served as the accountability manipulation. As a means o f strengthening this
manipulation, the character was also described as being under a lot or a little pressure
from his boss. The decision was described as either highly significant or not, and either
reversible or not.
Because there are no costs associated with simply selecting a strategy, the authors
devised a system whereby costs were associated with selection so that participants
couldn’t simply choose the most complex strategy every time. This system allotted
participants a given number o f ‘decision resource units’ (DRUs), which represented the
amount o f time, effort, and analysis required for the use of a particular strategy. Each
strategy was assigned a number o f DRUs, with more analytic strategies having a higher
number. In choosing their strategies, participants could not exceed the number of DRUs
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that had been allotted to them. In this way, the authors developed costs associated with
strategy selection.
Both studies showed main effects for all three variables and no interactions.
Accountability, decision significance, and decision irreversability all resulted in the choice
o f more highly analytic strategies. These studies appear to be even one step further
removed from real life than the previously mentioned studies since the task required the
participant to assume the role of a character in the problem, instead of imposing these
variables directly on the participant.
The third study accounted for this lack of realism by imposing the problem directly
on the participant; they were no longer asked to assume the role of the main character in a
written problem. In addition, accountability was operationalized in a more traditional
manner; participants expected to defend their decisions to others. The same variables were
manipulated as in the first two studies, but participants were asked to make true decisions
that were either part of a long term, important research project or of a small pilot study
(significance manipulation), could or could not be reversed (reversibility manipulation),
and that they would either have to defend in front of a small group of their peers or not
(accountability manipulation).
Results showed main effects for accountability and significance, but not for
reversibility. Accountability and high significance caused participants to choose more
highly analytic strategies. The effect o f accountability was significant, while the effect of
decision significance was only marginally significant. It should not, however, be concluded
that accountability is a stronger variable than significance. The findings are limited to this
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study and the means by which the variables were manipulated and measured. The
important thing to note, however, is that accountability led to the selection and
implementation of more complex decision strategies, a result that is wholly consistent with
research previously discussed.
Arkes, Christensen, Lai, and Blumer (1987) examined the effect of justification on
participants’ degree of confidence in their judgments of answers to general knowledge
questions. Justification was manipulated by telling participants that they would have to
explain some o f their answers to a group of other participants. It was thought that having
to justify a response would reduce the overconfidence that individuals typically have in the
accuracy of their judgments.
Justification was the only independent variable, and participants in the justification
condition were told that after completing the questionnaire, they would each be asked to
explain two of their answers to the rest o f the group. No mention o f justification was
made to control participants. Participants were given 35 general knowledge questions,
each followed by two possible answers. An example of the type o f question asked was
“Which is larger? Great Britain or Greenland?” All participants were asked to answer each
o f the questions and then give an estimate o f their confidence in the correctness of their
response on a 50 to 100% scale. The experimenter gave an example of an answer to a
question and gave a justification for why she chose her answer. The first five questions
were then used as practice questions for the experimental group. After everyone answered
all five, participants were each asked to explain to the group how they decided on a
particular answer. Participants in the experimental group then answered the remaining 30

41

questions and gave their confidence levels. After completion of the questionnaire,
participants were asked to explain their answers to two randomly chosen questions. The
dependent measures were accuracy o f the answers, confidence level, and the length of
time in lOths o f a minute that participants spent on the questionnaire. In addition, a
measure o f overconfidence was calculated by taking the average confidence level reported
and subtracting the proportion o f the items answered correctly.
Consistent with the hypothesis, participants who had to justify their responses were
significantly less overconfident in their responses than control participants. However, their
answers were no more accurate than those who did not have to justify their responses.
They did, however, take significantly more time to complete the questionnaire than control
participants. The authors suggested that participants spent more time reviewing the
possible answers and therefore became less confident in the accuracy of a given response.
It is important to note that decreased overconfidence was not accompanied by
increased accuracy in this study. It is not clear why this occurred; it may have been due to
the nature of the questions asked. There simply may not have been much variance in the
participants’ ability to answer these general knowledge questions in the first place.
However, it is possible to imagine situations in which increased consideration of multiple
alternative answers may lead to increased accuracy, especially when the correct answer is
not obvious. One note of criticism toward this study was the manner in which time on the
task was measured. Participants were asked to write down the number displayed on a
clock-counter when they had completed the questionnaire. These instructions were given
prior to answering any questions, so participants were probably aware that they were
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being timed. This measure may have served as an unintended secondary pressure for all
participants, and it is not clear in what way it may have altered their accuracy or
reasoning. However, because this was a constant across all participants, it could not affect
differences between the experimental and control groups, but it should be kept in mind
when interpreting the results.
The last study to be discussed is most relevant to the current study because it tested
the effects of both accountability and responsibility on judgments in a multiattribute
decision making task. A multiattribute decision making task involves a set of alternatives
for which qualities along various dimensions must be considered. As in previous studies,
accountability and responsibility were examined as a potential means o f increasing
cognitive effort and the use o f more complex decision strategies. The dependent variables
were measures of cognitive effort inferred from assessments o f the amount o f information
searched. Weldon and Gargano (1988) asked participants to evaluate a series of jobs, each
o f which was described on five dimensions. The overall evaluation consisted o f rating how
good each job was on a scale of one to seven with very bad and very good as anchors.
Accountability was manipulated by asking participants to provide their names and phone
numbers so that the experimenter could contact them later to learn what information was
used to make the judgments and why certain judgments were made. Responsibility was
varied by leading participants to believe that they were either one of 16 evaluators (shared
responsibility) or that they alone were the only evaluator (sole responsibility). Those who
believed their evaluations would be combined with others’ thought that their responses
were anonymous. All participants believed their evaluations would be used by a real
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vocational research organization in making future decisions. Therefore, the decision
importance was quite high for all conditions.
Weldon and Gargano expected that accountability would moderate the relationship
between responsibility and effort by reducing the differences typically found between
conditions of shared and sole responsibility. It has been shown in the past that individuals
who share responsibility for this same task tend to exert less cognitive effort than
individuals who feel sole responsibility (Weldon & Gargano, 1985). The authors predicted
that accountability would eliminate these differences by causing all individuals to exert the
same amount of cognitive effort, regardless of degree of responsibility. Results revealed an
interaction of accountability and responsibility on amount of information searched, such
that judges who worked alone tended to search for more information than participants
who shared responsibility, except under conditions o f accountability. Thus, for this
dependent variable, accountability reduced the typical cognitive loafing effects that occur
when individuals' sense of responsibility is diffused. However, there were no significant
effects of accountability on a measure o f the degree o f consistency with which information
was processed. The authors suggested that these results could be due to participants’
expectations about what they would have to justify. Since the instructions implied that
participants would be accountable for which dimensions were used and how they
influenced judgment, participants were less concerned with consistency in judgment and
more concerned with what information they were using to arrive at a judgment.
The interpretation offered by Weldon and Gargano (1988) highlights the previously
overlooked importance of the manner in which accountability is manipulated and the
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potential for what may appear to be subtle differences in instructions to cause significantly
different results in performance. The effects o f accountability may depend on what one
makes someone accountable for. More specifically, it demonstrates the possible
differential influence of accountability that emphasizes attention to the processes involved
in judgment versus attention to simply the outcome o f such processes.
Some may suggest that it is perhaps unreasonable to expect a great deal of
improvement in our abilities to introspect and discern what processes are actually
occurring. After all, much research has demonstrated that we are very poor assessors of
our mental activities since we usually only have access to their products. This is true in
spite of our convictions that we do have such access (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). However,
the results of many of the previous studies suggest that there may be room for a
motivational influence such as accountability to increase attention toward the cognitive
processes which guide performance.
Accountability. Responsibility, and Identifiabilitv
Accountability and responsibility. One of the goals of the present study was to tease
apart the effects of accountability and responsibility. As mentioned before, accountability
has, within the bulk of the research, come to mean having to provide an account for or
justify one’s opinions or position. Responsibility, on the other hand, seems to imply some
degree o f ownership of results or outcomes that is not necessarily implied by
accountability. This liability for outcomes is likewise not necessarily accompanied by
justification. Previous research has not made a clear distinction between these variables
and has sometimes used them interchangeably.
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McAllister, Mitchell, and Beach’s (1979) previously mentioned study had
participants assume the role of the central character in a written organizational problem.
The character was described as either personally responsible for the decision or only
minimally responsible because the decision served as a recommendation to be reviewed by
others. Participants were not required to justify their chosen strategy, nor was this
required of the central character, in whose position participants imagined themselves. This
situation is quite different from the majority o f the research, in which accountable
participants truly believed they would have to verbally justify their behavior to another
individual. As a means of bolstering the manipulation or intended feelings of
accountability, an additional component of pressure was added to the problem. The central
character was described as being under either high or very little pressure from his
supervisor to make the decision. This additional manipulation serves to complicate the
issue even further, sincelt is not clear how pressure affects decision strategies. While
accountability typically leads to more effortful processing, it appears a reasonable
possibility that pressure could lead individuals to respond in variable ways, depending on
the kind of pressure (e.g., social, financial, or time) and on individual differences. Some
people may find pressure to be motivating while others may feel it to be debilitating. These
issues are equally important but should be tested separately in order to isolate their effects.
These studies confounded several variables, making it difficult to incorporate the findings
into the accountability research.
An additional study not previously mentioned examined the effects o f accountability
on training effectiveness (DeMatteo, Dobbins, & Lundby, 1994). Participants went
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through a training session on interviewing skills and subsequently responded to questions
regarding their reactions and motivation to transfer the training. A test on the content of
training material was completed as a measure of learning. Participants thought they would
either participate in a discussion with the experimenter and her assistants, be asked to
watch a videotape of an interview and critique it, or not have to do anything following
training. Although results showed that the accountability manipulations led participants to
learn more and take more notes, this manipulation did not include a true justification.
Participants were obviously motivated to attend to the training, and this effect of the
manipulation should not be overlooked. However, the subtle differences between this and
other accountability manipulations should not be ignored either.
Looking from the opposite perspective, few of the accountability studies reviewed
earlier involved any degree of responsibility, such that participants were liable for some
future outcomes resulting from their judgments or decisions. This exclusion does not make
the results any less revealing and thus should not be viewed as a fault; however, it does
seem to limit the external generalizability since it is likely that individuals who are in a
position o f defending their views or decisions are typically responsible for the outcomes
that result from their implementation.
Only two studies previously mentioned led participants to believe their decisions
would be real and that they would therefore be responsible as well as accountable. The
first study involved the financial aid allocation decision (Adelberg & Batson, 1978).
Results of this manipulation found negative effects o f accountability, but the variables of
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accountability (having to justify the decision) and responsibility (being liable for the
outcomes) were essentially confounded since participants perceived both to be operating.
The second study (Weldon & Gargano, 1988) crossed accountability and
responsibility and measured cognitive effort expended in the evaluation of a series of parttime jobs. Here participants were either solely or jointly responsible and either accountable
or not accountable. The only problem with this study is that it served to confound
identifiability with responsibility. Participants who shared responsibility with others were
told that their answers, which were entered into a microcomputer, would be immediately
combined with those of other participants and, therefore, not traceable to the individual. In
this way, participants who were solely responsible were identifiable and participants who
shared responsibility were not identifiable. It is not clear how participants who perceived
their responses to be anonymous could be convinced that they were simultaneously
accountable and should be prepared to discuss why they responded as they did. In any
event, it is important that the effects of identifiability be extracted from those of
responsibility.
Accountability and identifiability. Most of the remaining studies which did not
include an element of responsibility tended to confound accountability and identifiability.
Participants who were not accountable were told that their responses were completely
confidential and therefore not traceable to them personally (Rozelle & Baxter, 1981;
Tetlock, 1983a; Tetlock, 1983b; Tetlock, 1985a; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock &
Kim, 1987; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). Although this method is recognized as a
means to enhance the power of the accountability manipulation, it is also important to
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recognize that these variables are conceptually distinct and should be treated as such,
despite their potential to co-occur in daily life.
Responsibility and identifiability. Research outside the area of accountability has
examined the effects of responsibility and identifiability. Much research in the area of
social psychology has demonstrated what is known as social loafing, or the reduction of
individual effort when individuals work in groups rather than alone. Latane, Williams, and
Harkins (1979) asked college students to make noise (clapping or shouting) either alone,
as part of a true group, or as part of a pseudogroup (participants thought their output
would be pooled with that of others). Participants who believed their output was shared
with others did not perform as well as individuals acting alone. In other words,
participants relaxed their efforts when they thought their output would be shared, and thus
not identifiable. To follow up on this reasoning, Williams, Harkins, and Latane (1981) first
replicated the previous experiment with a shouting task and found the same results. The
authors then included an additional manipulation of identifiability. This variable turned out
to be quite important; it eliminated social loafing effects when present and led to reduced
efforts by individuals working alone when removed.
These findings are especially important to keep in mind when interpreting the results
o f the accountability research. If the removal of identifiability was enough to lead to
significant differences in performance in the shouting experiment, it is equally possible for
it to have similar effects in those studies that confounded identifiability with either
accountability or responsibility.
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This Investigation
Overview o f variables. The purpose o f this study was to tease apart the effects of
accountability, responsibility, and identifiability on the quality o f the alternatives generated
to an ill-defined problem. Accountability is defined as whether or not an individual
provides a justification for a particular response; accountability is further differentiated by
whether the problem solving process or outcome must be justified. Responsibility is
defined as the perception that one shares responsibility for a task with others (shared
responsibility) or whether one is solely responsible for a task (sole responsibility). Lastly,
identifiability is defined as whether or not an individual perceives his or her responses to
be identifiable or traceable, versus anonymous. No study to date has systematically
examined the effects of these three variables on the alternative generation stage of illdefined problem solving. This study defines quality as the resolving power of the
generated alternatives. Resolving power is the degree to which the solution addresses the
conflicting aspects of the problem (Upshaw, 1975, cited in Scherer, 1989). The use of
resolving power as the chosen measure o f quality will possibly provide a theoretical
contribution to the existing line o f research on alternative generation conducted by Scherer
and Billings (1986) and Butler (1995), which has also used this same measure of quality.
In addition, the investigation o f the antecedents of resolving power may have practical
implications for organizations attempting to understand how to maximize the generation
o f alternatives that resolve multiple objectives.
Predictions and rationale. The first objective was to determine whether accountability
adds any motivational force beyond that produced by high identifiability. Though previous
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work confounded accountability with identifiability, the general assumption o f this study is
that due to the justifiability component o f accountability, accountability still causes a
greater expenditure o f cognitive effort than no accountability, even under conditions of
high identifiability.
Hypothesis 1: The quality o f the solutions generated will be higher under both
conditions o f accountability (process and outcome) compared to the no
accountability condition.
The second objective was to tease apart the effects o f accountability for a process
from the effects o f accountability for an outcome on the quality of solutions generated.
Though it appears that accountability seems to mobilize more cognitive effort, it is not
clear where and how that effort will be directed. Moreover, no study has revealed whether
accountability for a process is more or less efficacious in producing high quality solutions
compared to accountability for an outcome. Recall however, that previous research has
shown an increase in the quality o f solutions generated as a result o f problem structuring
techniques, which serve as aids to facilitate the problem solving process (Pitz, Sachs, &
Heerboth, 1980; Scherer & Billings, 1986). In addition, the work of Herek et al. (1987) in
their study of international crises served to highlight the potential importance and benefit
of focusing attention on the problem solving stages as a means o f arriving at higher quality
outcomes. For these reasons, it was proposed that under conditions of high identifiability,
accountability for a process would result in greater cognitive effort being directed towards
the problem solving process than accountability for an outcome, which would direct effort
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toward the problem solution. Consequently, efforts directed at the process would be
reflected by improved quality in the outcome, or solution.
Hypothesis 2: The quality o f solutions generated will be higher
under conditions of process accountability than for outcome
accountability.
A third goal was to separate the effects of accountability and responsibility on
solution generation and to determine whether accountability moderates the effects of
responsibility. As noted before, accountability has often been regarded as having to give a
justification for something, whereas responsibility has been studied by varying the degree
o f responsibility (shared versus sole). Some studies have used these labels and
operationalizations interchangeably, making their effects unclear. Whereas it has typically
been shown that shared responsibility results in reduced levels o f effort relative to sole
responsibility, it was expected that due to both the identifiability and justification
components o f accountability, accountability would serve to moderate the effect of
responsibility by eliminating the differences in effort across responsibility conditions.
Hypothesis 3: The average of the quality of solutions across both levels of
responsibility under both levels of accountability will be higher than either shared
or sole responsibility under no accountability. In addition, solution quality will be
higher under sole responsibility compared to shared responsibility in the no
accountability condition.
The final objective of this study was to isolate the effects of responsibility and
identifiability. It has long been known that when individuals’ outputs are identifiable, they
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are likely to exert high levels of effort, and when their outputs are not identifiable, they
consistently exert low levels of effort (Williams, Harkins, & Latane, 1981). These results
occur regardless o f whether these individuals perceive themselves to be part o f a group or
not. It therefore follows that any attempts to examine the efforts o f individuals either as
part of a group or alone should not overlook the role of identifiability. However, research
examining the role of responsibility has tended to manipulate this variable by inducing
participants to believe that they share responsibility with others or are solely responsible
for their outputs. When responsibility is shared, members’ outputs are usually pooled
together, thus making their outputs unidentifiable as well. It is therefore speculated that
much of the reduced efforts resulting from shared responsibility are in fact due to a lack of
identifiability. For these reasons, it was hypothesized that under conditions of no
accountability, high identifiability would result in consistent levels of cognitive effort
across shared and sole responsibility conditions.
Hypothesis 4: The quality o f solutions generated will be equal
across conditions of shared and sole responsibility when
identifiability is high; when identifiability is low, sole responsibility will yield
higher quality solutions than shared responsibility.
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Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 296 undergraduates enrolled in_psychology at the University of
Nebraska at Omaha. They were volunteers and received extra credit in exchange for their
participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one o f twelve treatment conditions.
These twelve conditions were the result o f a 3 X 2 X 2 factorial, with accountability
(process, outcome, or no accountability), responsibility (shared vs. sole), and identifiability
(high or low) as the independent variables. The average age o f the participants was 24,
and 93 were male and 203 were female. 224 participants were white, 34 were African
American, 4 were Hispanic, and 34 were of some other ethnic background.
Materials and Task
Participants were presented with a written description o f a dilemma regarding
parking problems at UNO (See Appendix A). This problem was chosen from a series of
ill-defined problems that were previously tested to identify participants’ reactions to the
problems (Scherer, Butler, Reiter-Palmon, & Weiss, 1994). This problem was rated as
high in realism by student participants. For this reason, it was speculated that this problem
would allow for high believability in the responsibility conditions. In other words, because
o f the nature o f the problem, participants would be likely to believe that they were
responsible for generating solutions that the university might consider.
Design constants. All participants were asked to generate as many solutions as
possible to the parking problem and to choose one solution which they felt was best. In
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addition, all participants were told that that their solutions would be considered by the
university in its attempt to resolve the parking dilemma.
Manipulation o f Independent Variables
Accountability. The level of accountability was manipulated by the experimenter
through task instructions. Outcome accountability participants were told that after
generating solutions and choosing the best solution, they would have to provide
justification for their choice o f best solution, which would later be read by UNO staff
members. Process accountability participants were told that after generating solutions and
choosing the best solution, they would have to provide a written justification for each of
their solutions, which would later be read by a UNO staff members. All accountable
participants provided written justification according to instructions, following completion
o f solution generation. For unaccountable individuals, no mention o f accountability was
made.

/

Responsibility. Participants in the sole responsibility condition were led to believe
that they alone were responsible for generating solutions to the problem. They were led to
believe that other participants were solving other problems identified by the university.
Participants in the shared responsibility condition were led to believe that responsibility for
generating solutions to the problem was shared with other individuals who were also
responding to the same problem. A manipulation check measure was taken to ensure that
participants understood and believed their assigned degree o f responsibility.
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Identifiability. Identifiable participants were asked to include their name on all pages
o f their responses. It was emphasized to unidentifiable participants that their outputs were
anonymous and therefore not traceable to their identity.
Dependent Measures
Several measures of performance were examined for the generated solutions.
Quantity o f solutions was calculated by summing the total number of unique, or non
repeating, solutions generated to the problem for each participant. The quality measures
were based on resolving power, or the degree to which a solution addressed and resolved
the conflicting aspects o f the problem (Upshaw, 1975). A total of 1800 solutions were
generated altogether and a reduced set o f 832 unique, or non-repeating, solutions was
derived from the complete set o f 1800 solutions. Two raters independently rated each of
the 1800 solutions as unique or repeating and then met to reach consensus over
disagreements. This process facilitated and enhanced the reliability of the final resolving
power rating process by reducing the number of solutions each rater had to read and rate.
For solutions that were repeating, the raters also determined which unique solutions they
matched. In addition to creating a reduced set o f 832 unique solutions, this process
ensured that every possible solution was matched to and assigned a unique solution
number. Ratings o f resolving power were then assigned to the reduced set o f 832 unique
solutions by another pair o f graduate student judges after a period of training and practice.
Ratings for resolving power were based on an 6-point scale, ranging from not addressing
any o f the issues in the problem at all to addressing only part o f the problem to fully
addressing all issues of the problem well (Appendix B). This resolving power scale has

56

been used in a number o f problem-solving studies in the past to assess solution quality
(e.g., Butler, 1995; Scherer, 1989, Scherer & Billings, 1986). The essential conflict o f the
problem was predetermined, and raters were first asked to decide whether each solution
resolved one or both facets of the essential conflict. A solution that resolved only one
facet of the problem was placed in the 1 to 3 rating category, and a solution that resolved
both facets of the problem was placed in the 4 to 6 rating category. The kappa coefficient
o f agreement was used to determine the degree of interrater reliability for the rating
process. The kappa statistic assesses consensus among multiple raters assigning objects to
categories, and it includes a correction for chance agreement. A kappa of 1 indicates
complete agreement, and a kappa o f 0 indicates no agreement, other than that expected by
chance. Kappa for this preliminary rating process indicated that the raters’ agreement was
significantly greater than chance (kappa = .77 ,z =35.09, p < .0001). Raters then made
independent ratings of each unique solution and assigned the final rating from 1 to 6.
Discrepancies were resolved through consensus. Again, the raters’ agreement before
consensus was significantly greater than chance (kappa = .68, z =35.30, p < .0001).
Three indices of the resolving power o f solutions were formed: (a) the number of
solutions generated with high resolving power, with high resolving power indicating a
solution rated 4 and above on the 6-point resolving power scale, (b) the proportion o f
solutions with high resolving power relative to the total number o f solutions generated,
and (c) the rating o f the solution with the highest resolving power. These three indices
were chosen because they each capture a different aspect o f solution quality. The number
o f resolving alternatives simply assesses the number o f high quality solutions, whereas the
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proportion of resolving alternatives assesses quality while taking into consideration the
quantity of solutions generated. The rating o f the solution with the highest resolving
power is a measure of the best solution the participant generated.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the twelve conditions. All participants
were presented with a written description o f the parking problem and the task instructions
(Appendix C). Participants were also presented with an audio tape o f the parking problem
and instructions. Participants were asked to play the tape on the tape player provided by
the experimenter and read along as they listened. After they finished reading and listening,
participants generated a list o f alternative solutions to the problem, and then chose the
solution they felt was best. They were allowed to refer to the problem as often as they
wished and were given ample paper to respond, so as not to limit the number of solutions.
Participants in the outcome accountability condition were told up front that after
generating solutions and choosing the best solution, they would have to provide written
justification for their choice o f best solution, which would later be read by UNO staff
members. Participants in the process accountability condition were told that after
generating solutions and choosing the best solution, they would have to provide written
justification for their list o f solutions and how they arrived at their solutions, to be read
later by a UNO staff members. No mention o f justification was made to unaccountable
participants.
Participants in the high responsibility condition were told that they alone were
responsible for generating solutions to the parking problem since no other participants

58

were responding to the same problem. Low responsibility participants were told that their
solutions would be considered along with those of other participants.
Participants in the high identifiability conditions were asked to write their names on
each page as a reminder that they were identifiable. In addition, identifiable participants
were given an “identification code” which was written on their scantron sheet. This code
was mentioned to participants to make their identifiability salient. Participants who were
not identifiable were told that their responses were anonymous and therefore not traceable
to them personally.
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Following completion of the task, participants were administered a manipulation
check questionnaire to verify that participants understood and believed their assigned
levels of accountability, responsibility, and identifiability. Participants were then asked to
give brief demographic information and were debriefed regarding the true purpose of the
\

/

.

research. This debriefing included a request to participants to not share any information
about the study with any other students. Participants were then given extra credit and
allowed to leave.
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Results
Manipulation Check Results
Because the previously noted hypotheses were of the greatest theoretical importance,
multiple comparisons were planned to test these hypotheses. However, a number of
problems occurred which precluded conducting these planned comparisons. Manipulation
check results indicated that participants either did not believe the manipulation or did not
answer the manipulation check questions carefully. Participants responded to four
questions to verify the identifiability and responsibility manipulations embedded in the
problem instructions. Responses to these questions were inconsistent, indicating that they
could not be combined to produce reliable indicators of the manipulation effectiveness.
Manipulation check questions were not used to verify the accountability manipulations
because the manipulations could be verified by the actual behavior of the participants.
However, two questions were included to assess the extent to which all participants,
regardless of accountability condition, mentally justified their solutions as they generated
them. Analysis of these questions indicated that participants in the no accountability
condition reported spending significantly more time mentally justifying their solutions than
participants in the accountability conditions.
In an attempt to most accurately test the premises outlined in this study,
manipulation check results were used to isolate those participants who reported that they
believed the manipulations.1Whereas isolation of participants that answered both
manipulation check questions in accordance with their condition is most desirable, this
criterion leads to a severely reduced data set. Therefore, one manipulation check question
1 Analyses conducted with all participants were nonsignificant.
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was chosen as an indicator of the effectiveness of each independent variable manipulation.
Because it was speculated that participants may not have understood some of the words in
the questions, items were chosen that were most clearly written and most closely
resembled the manipulation instructions. Items number 1,3, and 6 were chosen (Appendix
D). For the identifiability manipulation, the item read, "The solutions and responses I have
provided can be traced to me personally.” For the responsibility manipulation, the item
read, “The solutions and responses I have provided will be combined with solutions
provided by other students, to be reviewed by the university.” This item was reverse
coded. To assess the accountability manipulation, the item read, “In generating solutions, I
thought about whether or not my solutions could be defended as good solutions.”
Unfortunately, no items were given that discriminated between outcome and process
accountability. Therefore, this question could only be used to determine whether
significant differences inthe amount of mental justification existed between accountable
and unaccountable participants. For all items, participants responded on a 10-item scale (0
to 9), and higher numbers indicated greater perceived identifiability, responsibility, and
accountability.
Isolated for analyses were the participants who responded to question 1,3, and 6 of
the manipulation check questionnaire in a direction consistent with their assigned
condition (as determined by the midpoint of the scale). For example, participants assigned
to the low identifiability condition who responded to question 1 with an answer less than
or equal to 4 were retained in the low identifiability condition. Table 1 shows the
breakdown of these results. For identifiability analyses, 180 participants remained (low
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Table 1
Manipulation Check Results

Variable

n

M

SD

Identifiability3
Low identifiability

111

1.19

1.14

High identifiability

69

7.19

1.40

Responsibility5
Shared responsibility

73

1.88

1.44

Sole responsibility

59

8.03

1.50

Accountability0
No accountability
High accountability
(Outcome/Process)

38

1.13

1.65

121

7.73

1.20

df

t

178

31.45*

130

23.97*

157

26.93*

Note. Higher mean scores indicate greater perceived identifiability, responsibility, and
accountability.
3 Item 1 was used for the identifiability manipulation check
b Item 3 (reverse coded) was used for the responsibility manipulation check
° Item 6 was used for the accountability manipulation check
* P < .001
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identifiability, n = 111; high identifiability, n = 69). For responsibility analyses, 132
participants remained (shared responsibility, n = 73; sole responsibility, n = 59), and for
accountability analyses, 159 participants were included (no accountability, n = 38;
outcome accountability, n = 58; process accountability, n = 63). Again, no manipulation
check questions were included to discriminate between the two types o f high
accountability, process and outcome, because participants were actually held accountable
for their problem solving process (process accountability) or their problem solving
outcome (outcome accountability).
After this data reduction, manipulation check results indicated significant differences
across conditions for each of the independent variables. Table 1 also includes these results.
Because significant differences in perceived identifiability, responsibility, and
accountability were present, subsequent analyses including the dependent variables of
interest were finally warranted.
Overview of Analyses Performed
Whereas the data reduction was necessary in order to only analyze information from
participants who understood and believed the manipulations, this reduction precluded
many of the planned comparisons due to the creation of cells with very few participants.
Recall that most o f the comparisons were chosen to assess interaction effects. For
example, one contrast called for testing the differences between shared and sole
responsibility under conditions o f no accountability. Only 38 participants were retained in
the no accountability condition, and the number of participants from this group that were
also retained for the responsibility analyses was extremely low. Though there was
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theoretical justification for the planned comparisons, such interaction analyses were
virtually impossible to do. To prevent losing important information about the independent
effects of identifiability, responsibility, and accountability on problem solving, omnibus F
tests were performed on the remaining participants’ data.
Because the reduced data resulted in unequal cell sizes, an alternate means of
partitioning the sums of squares, known as analysis of unique sources, was used.
According to Keppel (1991), this method uses a multiple regression approach to calculate
sums of squares that reflect only the variability that is uniquely associated with a particular
main effect or interaction. As a result, the sums o f the various components will not add up
to the total sums of squares, unless the design is balanced. Whereas this property of
uniqueness is present in designs with equal cell sizes, it is not automatically present in
unbalanced designs. This analysis o f unique sources method o f partitioning the sums of
squares can be performed through the univariate MANOVA command in SPSS.
Univariate analyses of variance were conducted for each o f the four dependent
measures, (a) quantity of solutions, (b) the number of solutions generated with high
resolving power, with high resolving power indicating a solution rated 4 and above on the
6-point resolving power scale, (c) the proportion of solutions with high resolving power
relative to the total number of solutions generated, and (d) the rating o f the solution with
the highest resolving power. Table 2 includes the results o f correlational analyses among
these four outcome variables, Separate univariate analyses were conducted for each of the
main and interaction effects, in order to retain the maximum amount o f data. Note that
different samples were used for these separate analyses, given that more data were
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Table 2
Correlations Among Outcome Variables

1

1. Quantity o f solutions
2. Number of Resolving Solutions

4

3

—

.64**

3. Proportion of resolving
solutions
4. Best Solution

2

—

.53**

.26**

.55**

—

.56**

Note. N=270; includes all participants who were retained for any analysis.
*p < .05
**p<.01

—
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retained for the analyses of main effects. Tests o f the interactions also included secondary
sets o f main effects analyses (with smaller n ’s) that were not interpreted. The results of
these additional main effects analyses can be found in Appendix E. Tests for three-way
interactions were impossible due to multiple cells containing one data point (See Appendix
F for cell sizes). An alpha level o f .05 was used for all statistical tests.
Quantity of Solutions
Tests of the assumptions o f analysis of variance revealed that heterogeneity of
variance was present for many solution quantity analyses (e.g., Bartlett-Box F = 20.42, p
< .0001, for responsibility). An outlier (z = 8.98) was discovered that appeared to be
creating significant differences in variability across a number of conditions. Cases with
standardized scores in excess o f 3.0 are regarded as potential outliers (Stevens, 1996;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). Whereas the presence o f multiple outliers may call for
transformation of the data to change the shape o f the distribution from a skewed to a more
normal distribution, the presence o f a single outlier does not require such transformations
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). The deviant data point was removed and subsequent tests of
the homogeneity assumption revealed that all heterogeneity was removed (e.g., BartlettBox F = 01, p = 91, for responsibility). Despite the removal o f this outlier, no significant
effects were found for solution quantity. Table 3 includes the results of the analyses of
variance for solution quantity. Because each analysis includes different data, Tables 4 and
5 show the different means and standard deviations for the interaction analyses.
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Table 3
Analysis o f Variance Results for Quantity of Solutions as a Function o f Identifiability
Responsibility, and Accountability

Source

n

ss

df

MS

F

B

1. Identifiability

178

2.60

1

2.60

.41

.52

2. Responsibility

131

.70

1

.70

.13

.72

3. Accountability

159

11.92

2

5.96

.98

.38

4. Identifiability X
Responsibility

77

2.48

1

2.48

.47

.49

5. Identifiability X
Accountability

90

24.09

2

12.04

2.05

.14

6. Responsibility X
Accountability

72

4.50

2

2.25

.35

.71
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Table 4
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Quantity o f Solutions

Identifiability
Low

High

n

M

SD

Shared Respty

22

4.55

2.06

Sole Respty

22

4.82

10

n

M

SD

20

4.30

2.08

2.32

13

5.31

2.84

4.40

2.07

7

3.14

2.80

Outcome Accountability 23

4.78

2.17

9

6.33

2.50

21

5.10

2.57

20

4.65

2.54

Responsibility

Accountability
No Accountability

Process Accountability
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Table 5
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Quantity o f Solutions

Responsibility
Sole

Shared
Accountability

n

M

SD

n

M

SD

No Accountability

7

4.43

2.23

11

4.46

2.54

Outcome Accountability

16

5.19

2.69

10

6.10

2.23

Process Accountability

19

4.42

2.36

9

5.78

3.03
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Number o f Resolving Solutions
Heterogeneity of variance was once again revealed for many analyses for the
number of resolving solutions. The same outlier that was previously removed for the
solution quantity analyses was once again removed. All subsequent tests for the
homogeneity o f variance assumption were not significant, and it was therefore decided
that there could be confidence in the results. Responsibility exerted a main effect on the
number o f resolving solutions, F (l,1 3 0 ) = 4.31

.05. Contrary to predictions,

participants in the shared responsibility condition (M = 2.32, SD = 1.53) generated more
highly resolving solutions than participants in the sole responsibility condition (M = 1.79,
SD = 1.30). Table 6 includes a summary of the analyses o f variance results, and Tables 7
and 8 show the means and standard deviations for the interaction analyses.
Proportion of Resolving Alternatives
Tests of the assumptions revealed that homogeneity o f variance was present for all
analyses for the proportion o f resolving alternatives. One main effect and one interaction
effect were found for proportion of resolving alternatives. Responsibility exerted a main
effect on proportion of resolving alternatives, F (1, 130) = 4.85, p < .05. Contrary to
predictions, participants in the shared responsibility condition (M = .50, SD = .27)
generated a higher proportion o f resolving alternatives than participants in the sole
responsibility condition (M = .40, SD = .28). A significant interaction between
identifiability and accountability was also found, F (2, 85)) = 4.61, p < .05. Simple effects
tests revealed significant differences between levels of accountability under high
identifiability, F (2, 85) =3.70, p < .05. Post-hoc comparisons using the Duncan test
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Table 6
Analysis o f Variance Results for Number o f Resolving Alternatives as a Function of
Accountability. Responsibility, and Identifiability

Source

n

ss

df

MS

F

2

1. Identifiability

178

.00

1

.00

.00

.99

2. Responsibility

131

8.81

1

8.81

4.31

.04

3. Accountability

158

2.64

2

1.32

.63

.54

4. Identifiability X
Responsibility

77

.47

1

.47

.20

.65

5. Identifiability X
Accountability

90

.30

2

.15

.09

.91

6. Responsibility X
Accountability

72

1.72

2

.86

.40

.67
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Table 7
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Number o f Resolving Alternatives

Identifiability
Low
n

M

High
SD

n

M

SD

Responsibility
Shared Respty

22

2.32

1.49

20

2.15

1.73

SoleRespty

22

1.77

1.45

13

1.92

1.26

No Accountability

10

1.90

1.37

7

2.29

1.38

Outcome Accountability

23

2.09

1.04

9

2.78

1.40

Process Accountability

21

1.62

1.47

37

2.22

1.27

Accountability
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Table 8
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Resolving Alternatives

Responsibility
Shared

Sole

M

SD

n

M

m

7

1.86

.90

11

2.00

1.55

Outcome Accountability

16

2.94

1.65

10

2.30

1.34

Process Accountability

19

2.32

1.34

9

1.78

1.79

Accountability

n

No Accountability
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revealed that highly identifiable but unaccountable participants (M = .87, SD =.23)
generated a higher proportion o f resolving solutions than highly identifiable participants in
either outcome or process accountability conditions (M = .46, SD = 30; M = -60, SD
=.29, respectively). No other significant effects were found for proportion o f resolving
alternatives. Table 9 includes a summary o f the analyses o f variance results and Tables 10
and 11 show the means and standard deviations for the interaction analyses.
Best Solution
Tests of the assumption o f homogeneity of variance revealed that significant
heterogeneity o f variance was present for the identifiability and accountability interaction
(Bartlett-Box F =3.06, p <01). However, because heterogeneity of variance increases the
likelihood o f type I error (Keppel, 1991) and this interaction effect was not significant, no
changes were made to attempt to eliminate this instance of heterogeneity of variance. A
main effect was found for accountability on best solution, F (2,155) = 11.77, p <05.
Contrary to predictions, post-hoc comparisons using the Duncan test revealed that
unaccountable participants (M = 4.61, SD =1.15) and outcome accountability participants
(M = 4.52, SD =1.08) each generated higher quality best solutions than participants in the

process accountability condition (M = 4.0, SD =1.38). No other effects were significant
for the best solution index of solution quality. Table 12 includes a summary of the analyses
of variance results and Tables 13 and 14 show the means and standard deviations for the
interaction analyses.
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Table 9
Analysis o f Variance Results for Proportion o f Resolving Solutions as a Function of
Accountability. Responsibility, and Identifiability

Source

n

ss

df

MS

F

B

1. Identifiability

179

.11

1

.11

1.30

.26

2. Responsibility

132

.36

1

.36

4.85

.03

3. Accountability

159

.10

2

.10

.62

.54

4. Identifiability X
Responsibility

78

.00

1

.00

.00

.97

5. Identifiability X
Accountability

91

.67

2

.33

4.61

.01

6 . Responsibility X
Accountability

73

.18

2

.97

.39

.09
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Table 10
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Proportion of Resolving Solutions

Identifiability
Low

n

M

High

SD

n

M

SD

Responsibility
Shared Respty

22

.49

.20

20

.54

.35

Sole Respty

23

.39

.27

13

.43

.30

No Accountability

11

.42

.23

7

.87

.23

Outcome Accountability

23

.50

.27

9

.46

.30

Process Accountability

21

.33

.27

20

.59

.29

Accountability

76
Table 11
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Proportion o f Resolving Solutions

Responsibility
Shared
Accountability

Sole

M

SD

n

M

SD

7

.46

.25

12

.49

.36

Outcome Accountability

16

.60

.31

10

.38

.24

Process Accountability

19

.54

.26

9

.36

.37

No Accountability

n
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Table 12
Analysis o f Variance Results for Best Solution as a Function o f Accountability.
Responsibility, and Identifiability

Source

n

SS

df

MS

F

1. Identifiability

179

.60

1

.60

.37

.55

2. Responsibility

132

4.31

1

4.31

2.60

.11

3. Accountability

159

11.77

2

5.89

3.93

.02

4. Identifiability X
Responsibility

78

.28

1

.28

.17

.68

5. Identifiability X
Accountability

91

2.89

2

1.45

1.24

.29

6 . Responsibility X
Accountability

73

1.77

2

.89

.59

.56

E
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Table 13
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Best Solution

Identifiability
Low

High

n

M

SD

n

M

SD

Shared Respty

22

4.27

1.39

20

4.55

1.05

Sole Respty

23

3.78

1.41

13

4.31

1.18

No Accountability

11

4.54

1.24

7

5.43

.54

Outcome Accountability

23

4.65

.71

9

4.67

1.12

Process Accountability

21

3.71

1.49

20

4.50

.95

Responsibility

Accountability
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Table 14
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Best Solution

Responsibility
Shared
Accountability

n

M

Sole
SD

n

M

SD

No Accountability

7

4.86

.38

12

4.42

1.44

Outcome Accountability

16

4.63

1.26

10

4.50

.97

Process Accountability

19

4.11

1.33

9

3.22

1.30
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Exploration of Low F Values
In theory, F values should be equal to 1 when there are no effects and should never be
less than 1. However, a number o f F values were calculated that were less than 1,
suggesting a potential inadequacy in the underlying model being used to represent the data
(Shine, 1982). Shine recommends testing the significance of such left-tailed F-ratios by
taking their reciprocals and reversing the degrees of freedom. The central F distribution
can then be used to test the significance o f these values in the normal manner. All analyses
resulted in a critical values of F 754 o f 253, for identifiability and responsibility analyses or
F 100,2 of 19.49, for accountability analyses. The reciprocals of these values are .004 and
.05. Thus, any calculated F values which are below these critical values should be
questioned. Of the 16 results with F’s less than one, two were statistically significantly less
than 1: (a) the effect of identifiability on the number of resolving alternatives, and (b) the
effect of identifiability and responsibility on the proportion o f resolving solutions. In these
two cases, it may be that some other unknown factor is operating to create effects that,
when unmeasured, are relegated to the error term. Thus, the null results obtained for these
two analyses are particularly suspect.
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Discussion
Overview
The primary goal o f this thesis was to explain solution quality for an ill-defined
problem as a function of three motivational variables: identifiability, responsibility, and
accountability. The basic assumption is that these variables will cause people to work
harder than they might otherwise work. This extra effort was expected to translate into
enhanced performance in the form o f higher solution quality. More specifically, this study
was designed to tease apart the independent effects o f these three motivational variables as
well as examine how they act together to jointly affect the amount o f effort a person is
willing to put forth toward the task o f solution generation.
The following discussion will begin with a reminder o f the methodological limitations
and cautions for interpretation, followed by a summary o f the findings, both predicted and
unexpected. Some potential interpretations o f the findings will be offered, along with
limitations for theoretical and applied generalizability. Lastly, implications for theory and
practice as well as suggestions for future research are offered.
Methodological Limitations
The most important methodological constraint is that a large amount of data was
lost in an attempt to most accurately test the premises outlined in this study. The
manipulation check questions designed to assess the effectiveness o f the manipulations
were not answered reliably, making it difficult to determine whether participants really
experienced their assigned conditions. One manipulation check question was chosen as an
indicator of the effectiveness of each independent variable manipulation, and participants
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who reported that they believed the manipulation were isolated for analysis. In other
words, participants who, though exposed to a particular manipulation, did not report belief
in that manipulation were excluded from analyses for that variable. It is possible that
different manipulation check questions may have isolated a different group o f participants,
for which different results may have been found.
In addition to the concern about which participants were removed from analyses, it is
also important to address the number o f participants removed from analyses. Chi-square
tests revealed that significant differences in participant loss existed for tests o f each of the
main effects (X2 =13.79, p <.001; X 2 =4.12, p <.05; X 2 = 8 .12, p <.05, for identifiability,
responsibility, and accountability, respectively). These results suggest that subject loss may
not have occurred randomly for these tests, and thus, the advantage o f random assignment
may have been eliminated. Chi-square tests for participant loss for tests o f the interactions
were not significant, suggesting that there was no differential loss o f data in these
conditions. Whereas random assignment may have been protected for the interaction
analyses, the absolute loss o f data was such that the resulting cell sizes were relatively
small. The small sample sizes may have reduced the power of the experiment to detect
significant differences. However, significant results that occurred in spite o f these power
limitations should be interpreted as relatively trustworthy, provided it can be concluded
that the appropriate participants were retained for analysis.
Despite the methodological limitations imposed by the data loss, the manipulations
used in this study are largely consistent with other research on identifiability,
responsibility, and accountability. However, the manipulations used here were free from
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the confounds that are often present in many other studies on these variables and may
serve to clear up some of the confusion surrounding results in this domain. In addition, the
operationalization of process and outcome accountability was new and may serve to
expand the research on accountability. Because this operationalization of accountability is
new and very specific, generalizability is therefore limited to the process and outcome of
solution generation only. Other means o f measuring processes and outcomes should be
distinguished from the methods used here.
In general, the hypotheses were unsupported, and a number o f unexpected results
occurred. These methodological constraints notwithstanding, the results which follow may
represent real differences in the effects o f the levels o f identifiability, responsibility, and
accountability in the solution generation context.
Summary of Results for Predictions
Effect of accountability on solution quality. Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicted a main
effect of accountability on solution quality with accountability (both process and outcome)
leading to higher solution quality than no accountability and with process accountability
leading to higher solution quality than outcome accountability. The logic is that
accountability leads to more effortful cognitive processing and will therefore result in
higher solution quality than no accountability. In addition, if the quality o f the solutions
from which individuals must choose is high, then the probability of a chosen alternative
being a good one increases. Therefore, one would predict that making participants
accountable for their solution generation process will result in higher quality solutions than
making participants accountable for their solution generation outcome. The predictions
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described in Hypotheses 1 and 2 required planned comparison analyses. However, recall
that due to the loss o f data, omnibus F-tests were conducted instead. Hypotheses 1 and 2
were not supported for any measures o f solution quality.
Effect o f responsibility and accountability on solution quality. Hypothesis 3
predicted an interaction between responsibility and accountability, with participants in
both levels of responsibility under high accountability generating higher quality solutions
than participants in either shared or sole responsibility conditions under no accountability.
In addition, hypothesis 3 predicted that under no accountability, solution quality would be
higher under sole responsibility than shared responsibility under no accountability.
Unfortunately, the reduction in data precluded significance testing o f these specific
planned comparisons. However, the implication of these hypotheses from an omnibus F
approach is that that although it has been typically shown that shared responsibility results
in reduced levels of effort relative to sole responsibility, it was expected that accountability
would serve to moderate the effect of responsibility on solution quality by eliminating the
differences in effort across responsibility conditions. No significant interactions between
responsibility and accountability were revealed as a result of omnibus F-tests. Thus,
Hypothesis 3 was not supported for any solution quality measures.
Effect of identifiability and responsibility on solution quality. Hypothesis 4 predicted
an interaction between identifiability and responsibility, such that under low identifiability,
sole responsibility would yield higher quality solutions than shared responsibility. Under
high identifiability, these differences would be eliminated and solution quality would not
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differ across conditions of shared and sole responsibility. Hypothesis 4 was testable, but
not supported for any of the solution quality measures.
Summary o f Unexpected Findings
Effect o f accountability on best solution. A significant main effect of accountability
on the quality o f the best solution was found. Recall that a main effect of accountability
was predicted by Hypotheses 1 and 2, which predicted that accountability (process and
outcome) would lead to higher quality than no accountability. In addition, process
accountability was predicted to lead to higher quality than outcome accountability.
Contrary to these predictions, unaccountable participants and outcome accountability
participants each generated higher quality best solutions than participants in the process
accountability condition. Because the comparisons were aposteriori, the complex contrast
between accountable (process and outcome combined) and unaccountable participants
could not be tested.

x

Effect o f responsibility on solution quality. Although specific hypotheses regarding
the main effects o f responsibility were not made, the predicted effects o f responsibility on
solution quality were nonetheless implicit. Recall that previous research in social
psychology has generally shown that when individuals perceive themselves to be part of a
group, they reduce the amount o f effort they expend, relative to individuals who are solely
responsible. A hypothesis based on this previous research would predict that participants
in the sole responsibility condition would generate higher quality problem solutions than
participants in the shared responsibility condition, as a reflection of the reduced effort
exhibited by shared responsibility participants.
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A significant difference between sole and shared responsibility was found for both the
number and proportion of resolving alternatives. However, contrary to predictions,
participants in the shared responsibility condition generated a higher number of resolving
alternatives and a greater proportion o f resolving alternatives than participants in the sole
responsibility condition.
Although a few hypotheses contained predictions that shared and sole responsibility
performance would be equal as a function of an interaction, never was there a prediction
that included higher performance among participants who shared responsibility relative to
those who were solely responsible. It is worth noting that examination o f the means for
the nonsignificant interaction o f responsibility and accountability suggest that this main
effect o f responsibility may be driven by differences in responsibility among high
accountability (both process and outcome) participants only. Clearly, this is a matter of
speculation based on observance of the means. This possibility nonetheless offers insights
for future research.
Effect o f identifiability and accountability on proportion of resolving alternatives. As
was the case for the main effect of responsibility, no specific hypotheses were made
regarding the joint effects of identifiability and accountability on solution quality. No
previous work has assessed the combined effects o f identifiability and accountability on
any variable; rather, most work has confounded the two variables by making
unaccountable participants anonymous and accountable participants identifiable. This
study was designed, in part, to tease apart the effects of these two variables.
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The predicted effect of accountability on solution quality has already been discussed.
Previous work on identifiability and solution generation has shown that when individual
outputs are identifiable, people generate more high quality solutions than individuals
whose solutions are unidentifiable (Scherer, 1985). Again, no specific predictions were
made about the joint effects o f these two variables.
A significant interaction was found between identifiability and accountability for
proportion of resolving alternatives. Under low identifiability conditions, there was no
effect o f accountability on solution quality. However, under high identifiability,
unaccountable participants generated a higher proportion o f resolving solutions than
participants in either outcome or process accountability conditions.
Interpretation of Findings
Effect of accountability on solution quality. Recall that accountability had an
unexpected effect on the quality o f the best solution, such that unaccountable participants
and outcome accountability participants each generated higher quality best solutions than
participants in the process accountability participants. Recall also that all participants were
asked to generate as many solutions as possible to the problem and to choose the solution
they felt was best. Outcome accountability participants were asked to provide a written
justification for why they thought the chosen solution was the best one. Although no
mention of justification was made to unaccountable participants, both unaccountable and
outcome accountability participants received instructions which suggested that the ‘best
solution* was the most important criterion. Process accountability participants, however,
were asked to provide a written justification for each o f their solutions. These participants
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received instructions which indicated that all of the solutions served as important criteria.
Thus, unaccountable and outcome accountability participants received instructions
suggesting one single criterion, whereas process accountability received instructions
suggesting multiple criteria.
These differences in instructions may appear to be very subtle. However, evidence
from previous research suggests that subtle details in accountability instructions may have
the potential to alter behavior in significant ways. Weldon and Gargano (1988) told
accountable participants that they would be contacted to share what information they used
to make their judgments in a multiattribute decision making task and why they used this
information. Results showed that accountability increased the amount o f information
searched, but not the consistency with which the information was processed, both of
which are indicators of cognitive effort. As was previously discussed, the authors
speculated that because the instructions implied that participants would be accountable for
which dimensions they used and how the dimensions influenced judgment, participants
may have been less concerned with consistency in judgment and more concerned with
what information they used to arrive at a judgment.
In the same vein, it is speculated here that because unaccountable and outcome
accountability participants were instructed to focus on their choice o f best solution, they
were more likely to focus on the quality o f one solution than process accountability
participants, who were asked to focus on every solution they could generate. For process
accountability participants, a cognitive resource limitation may have been operating to
cause participants to diffuse effort across the entire solution set. The end result of this
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cognitive resource deficit is that no one solution received concentrated attention or effort.
Contrary to process accountability participants, unaccountable and outcome accountability
participants were not operating under cognitive resource limitations and were able to
generate higher quality best solutions than process accountability participants.
Effect o f responsibility on solution quality. The majority of previous research on
responsibility has shown that people who are solely responsible tend to perform better
than people who share responsibility with others. Such performance differences are
explained by the fact that people who share responsibility tend to reduce the amount of
effort they exert. This study found that people who believed they shared responsibility for
solution generation performed better than people who believed they were solely
responsible for solution generation. Two other studies found similar effects that might
shed light on the question of why shared responsibility may lead to enhanced performance
over sole responsibility:^
In a series o f experiments on the effects o f various types o f responsibility and
identifiability on recall in a decision making task, Price (1987) similarly identified a
situation in which shared responsibility participants recalled more information concerning
a decision they made correctly than sole responsibility participants. However, this effect
was only evident for unidentifiable participants. Similar to the current study, the
participants’ responses to the decision task were actually going to be used, making the
task meaningful to participants. Price suggested that in the absence of identifiability,
participants in the sole responsibility group decreased their efforts. Because participants in
shared responsibility groups are accustomed to at least some amount o f anonymity, the
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lack of identifiability did not alter performance. In addition, it was suggested that
participants who shared responsibility with others may have felt a sense o f responsibility to
the other groups members to work hard to achieve their assigned goal.
It is important to note that whereas the participants’ decisions were pooled, each
decision was important because the decisions were tallied to result in a majority vote
decision. Unlike many group efforts where individual inputs may have reduced impact,
every individual in this study made a unique contribution to the final outcome. Research
previous and subsequent to Price’s (1987) study suggests that when participants do not
believe that their contribution represents unique input, they reduce their efforts (Harkins &
Petty, 1982; Weldon & Mustari, 1988). Weldon and Mustari suggest that degree of felt
dispensability may account for cognitive loafing in shared responsibility situations.
Participants who shared responsibility for a multiattribute judgment task exerted less effort
and felt more dispensable than participants working alone. Furthermore, Harkins and Petty
indicate that this degree o f perceived dispensability can be reduced for difficult or
challenging tasks, toward which participants are more likely to feel they can make a
unique contribution.
Together these studies suggest that when participants feel they are making a unique
contribution, they may work hard in spite of anonymity or shared responsibility. However,
this logic would predict that when all participants feel their contributions are unique, either
because individual or collective output influences the outcome or because the task is
challenging, there will be no differences between sole and shared responsibility.
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A study by Harkins and Jackson (1985) provides one more piece of the puzzle to
explain why shared responsibility might lead to better performance than sole responsibility.
Harkins and Jackson discovered that when participants believed their own performance on
a brainstorming task could be directly compared with others’ performance, they were
likely to generate more uses for an object than participants who believed they were the
only ones working on that specific object. Comparability was manipulated by telling
participants that the object for which they would be generating uses was the same as or
different from objects given to other participants. Furthermore, all participants were told
that the number o f uses they generated was comparable only to the number generated by
others working on the same object. In other words, it was made salient that comparability
was only possible for those working on the same object.
In the current study, responsibility was confounded with comparability, as defined by
Harkins and Jackson. Participants who shared responsibility believed their responses
would be pooled with responses o f others working on the same problem. Participants who
were solely responsible believed other participants were working on a different problem.
Given the results discovered by Harkins and Jackson, it is possible that the perception that
a person’s solutions could be compared with others may have compelled participants in
the shared responsibility condition to outperform participants working alone.
Effect o f identifiability and accountability on solution quality. The interaction
between identifiability and accountability for proportion of resolving alternatives revealed
that highly identifiable but unaccountable participants generated a higher proportion of
resolving solutions than highly identifiable participants in either outcome or process
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accountability conditions. A number o f points are important here. The first point worth
highlighting is that accountability had no effect in the absence o f identifiability. Recall that
almost all previous accountability research has confounded identifiability and
accountability. Therefore, any significant effects of accountability have been the result o f a
manipulation that contained both identifiability and justification components. This study
assessed the independent effects of identifiability and justification, and the results suggest
that identifiability is in fact an important, yet often overlooked, component of
accountability. Justification in the absence of identifiability failed to influence the overall
solution set quality in a significant way.
The second important conclusion from these results is that, contrary to much
previous research on accountability, people who are accountable may have poorer
performance than people who are not accountable. Only on a few occasions has this effect
been shown before. Given that accountability has a tendency to cause people to be more
vigilant information processors, it may be that accountable participants attempted to use
all o f the information presented in the problem to generate solutions. The problem
(Appendix A) describes the difficulty associated with finding a parking spot on campus,
especially in the morning hours when a lot of students attend classes. In addition to
describing the main constraints of maintaining good community relations, operating within
the university budget, and allowing the students to get to class in a timely and hassle-free
manner, the problem also includes a rather lengthy discussion about the possibility of
building an access road through the park to ease traffic congestion. Given the essential
conflict just discussed, this information does not seem particularly useful or relevant to
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creating more available parking spots. Previous research has shown that when
accountability is introduced, people tend to think in more integratively complex ways
about irrelevant information as well as relevant information (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989).
Attempts to integrate this information about building a road may have led accountable
participants to generate some solutions that focused on this aspect o f the problem, even
though the option of building a road was not important information for successfully
solving the problem. A consistent tendency for accountable participants to generate
solutions based on irrelevant information may have led to a decreased proportion of
resolving alternatives relative to unaccountable participants. Research assessing the types
or categories of solutions as a dependent variable may reveal whether accountable
participants are more likely to generate solutions that address irrelevant aspects of the
problem.
Task effects. Previous research assessing the characteristics of the parking problem
and other ill-defined problems has indicated that the parking problem is highly involving
for problem solvers (sampled from university students) (Scherer, Butler, Reiter-Palmon,
&Weiss, 1994). Moreover, anecdotal evidence collected by the researcher suggests that
many participants were very concerned about and engaged in the problem. Several
participants continued to talk about the problem and potential solutions with the
experimenter after the experiment was over. Together this information suggests that the
problem may have induced a great deal o f motivation in problem solvers, independent of
the experimental manipulations.
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Brickner, Harkins, and Ostrom (1986) found that typical differences in performance
as a function o f identifiability are eliminated when a task is personally involving. Brickner
et.al. manipulated identifiability and personal involvement and found that under low
identifiability, participants displayed social loafing and generated fewer thoughts in
reaction to a proposal than participants in a high identifiability condition. However, when
the proposal included plans that would affect the participants directly, these differences in
performance disappeared. Apparently, the highly involving nature o f the task motivated
participants enough to overcome the effort reduction that usually accompanies anonymity.
The parking problem may have motivated the participants in this study in a manner
similar to the highly involving task used by Brickner et.al (1986). All participants in this
study believed their results would be reviewed by university employees in an attempt to
resolve the problem. In addition, because the participants were students, it is likely that
they felt directly affected by the problem. If participants’ motivation was enhanced
because o f the personally-involving nature o f the task, there may have been less room for
other variables such as identifiability, responsibility, and accountability to exert a
motivational influence.
Another characteristic of the task that may have influenced the results o f this
experiment is the degree of task complexity. Relative to simple tasks requiring physical
effort or cognitive tasks requiring expression o f opinions, an ill-defined problem scenario
with conflicting objectives can be regarded as a relatively complex task. Ill-defined
problems do not have one right answer, allow for multiple means o f solving the problem,
and often contain irrelevant information in addition to relevant information. Such task
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complexity has been shown to moderate the effect of motivational variables on
performance. Harkins and Petty (1982) demonstrated that when participants in a shared
responsibility condition performed a task that was particularly challenging, performance
was equal to that of sole responsibility participants. Follow-up studies revealed that when
the task was challenging, participants felt that their responses represented a unique
contribution unlikely to be duplicated by other persons. This perceived influence over
outcomes caused participants who shared responsibility to exert just as much effort as
participants who were solely responsible.
The most important implication of such research is that the task complexity
moderated the effect of a motivational variable on performance. It is possible that the
parking problem may have exerted similar influences, and these potential effects cannot be
explored in this study. Both task involvement and task complexity were design constants
in this study; it is possible they may have operated as moderators o f the effects of
identifiability, responsibility, and accountability on performance.
Limitations
As the previous discussion indicates, other types of problems and other types of
cognitive tasks may lead to different results. Important task effects on problem solving
performance have been identified in the past, and it is speculated that such effects are too
often overlooked. The personally-involving nature of the problem and the degree o f task
complexity have been suggested as possible moderators o f the effects o f motivational
variables on performance. Other task characteristics may also influence the effects of
identifiability, responsibility, and accountability on solution quality.
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The participants used in this study can be regarded as novice problems solvers. The
results should not be extended to research conducted on more experienced problem
solvers, who have been known to perform very differently from novices in the problem
solving domain. For example, experts can more readily identify the most important aspects
o f a problem and are less distracted by irrelevant surface features than novice problem
solvers. This characteristic o f experts suggests that experts may be less susceptible to the
dilution effect o f accountability. Recall that the dilution effect refers to the tendency for
accountable people to integrate irrelevant as well as relevant information into a solution.
Other differences between novices and experts may also moderate the effect of
identifiability, responsibility, and accountability on solution quality.
Lastly, recall that the measure o f solution quality used here was resolving power, or
the degree to which the solutions successfully resolved the conflicting aspects of the
problem. Other measures o f solution quality include how appropriate or original the
solution is, for example. The results are limited to resolving power and may differ for
creativity or other measures o f decision quality.
Implications and Future Research
An extensive review of the research on identifiability, responsibility, accountability,
and performance illustrates quite clearly that a great deal o f attention has been given to the
topic of how to motivate people to exert increased effort on both physical and cognitive
tasks. This line of research exists in response to the well-documented tendency for people
to be physically and cognitively lazy, especially when they perceive that they share efforts
with others. Identifiability, responsibility, and accountability have been identified as
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possible means of decreasing these tendencies to be a cognitive miser or to diffuse
responsibility among members o f a group. Although these motivational variables have
been recognized as a means o f overcoming miserly tendencies, very little research has
addressed the effect of motivational variables on problem-solving performance, especially
performance on ill-defined problems. For example, identifiability and responsibility
research primarily includes physical and low-level cognitive tasks, such as shouting and
opinion expression. Though accountability research tends to focus more consistently on
cognitively challenging tasks, such as impression formation, opinion expression, judgment,
and decisions, no study prior to the present one has examined accountability influences on
solution generation for ill-defined problems.
People regularly face ill-defined problems that elicit feelings o f uncertainty and
hesitation because no one correct answer exists. In the absence o f empirical evidence to
guide managers, unfounded prescriptions about how to motivate problem solvers to
successfully solve these complex problems are followed. The prescriptions can be
ineffective at best and harmful at worst. For example, within business contexts, it is
commonly assumed that making all employees highly accountable and responsible for their
actions will automatically elicit better performance from those employees. This prevalent
notion has not been empirically supported thus far. In general, the current line of research
on motivational influences on cognition and behavior must be expanded to include
problem solving tasks, a domain which has heretofore been overlooked.
It is not yet clear how making an individual’s output identifiable affects the quality of
the individual’s problem solving process or final solution. Scherer (1985) found that when
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outputs are identifiable, people generate more solutions to a problem than when their
outputs are anonymous. However, solution quality was only improved when the problem
was relatively simple. Results of the current study did not replicate the quantity effect
found by Scherer but may lend support for the quality effect. Because the parking problem
contains multiple conflicting objectives, such that satisfaction o f one objective tends to
preclude the satisfaction o f other objectives, it may constitute a difficult problem. The task
complexity may have eliminated the impact of identifiability on performance. Future
research should include problems that vary in difficulty, perhaps in the degree to which
problem objectives conflict with one another. It may be, however, that successful
performance on ill-defined problems is inherently challenging and therefore not susceptible
to the influence of identifiability.
It is not yet clear how requiring employees to share responsibility within a team
environment affects the quality o f decisions made by individual members or the team as a
whole. If the results found here represent reality, such that people who share responsibility
outperform people who are solely responsible, the use of responsibility as a motivational
variable has important implications for small groups and teams. If problem solvers are
inclined to exert more effort when they share responsibility, either because of social
evaluation fears, competition, or the desire to achieve a group goal, then the use o f teams
may be an important means of enhancing performance.
Future research should replicate this study, perhaps with more realistic groups
instead o f nominal groups. Research with intact groups or newly formed groups that
actually work together will contribute to the literature on responsibility, nominal groups,
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and teams. Whereas small group performance has been addressed, less is known about
work teams where members work somewhat independently and then combine their efforts.
Even less is known about the importance o f group size on problem solving
performance. What happens when three employees share responsibility for a problem?
What happnes when ten people share this same responsibility? Future research should take
into account possible differences in diffusion o f responsibility as a function of group size.
Recall that a relationship between responsibility and accountability on solution
quality was not found. However, further examination o f these nonsignificant results
appeared to indicate that responsibility resulted in performance differences only among
participants who were highly accountable. Though this possibility could not be tested
post-hoc, future research should specifically examine whether accountability moderates
the effect of responsibility on solution quality. It is conceptually plausible that high
accountability, for either a process or an outcome, could do more than simply eliminate
differences between people who share responsibility and those who do not. That is,
accountability could also motivate people who share responsibility to exert a higher level
o f effort, especially if individuals feel accountable to other group members.
Because empirical work has shown that people generally reduce their efforts when
they share responsibility, the results of this study may have interesting implications for
applied settings. It is important to find prescriptions to overcome the effects of social
loafing. Accountability offers a potential avenue for improving individual effectiveness in a
team context.
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It is not yet clear how requiring someone to justify their problem solving affects the
quality o f those solutions. Furthermore, does it matter whether the person is accountable
for the process used to arrive at a solution or simply for the final solution? The importance
of a process and outcome distinction in problem solving has yet to be determined. The
results of this research suggest that making problem solvers accountable for their solution
generation process or final solution will not necessarily enhance the quality of the
solutions they generate. Siegal-Jacobs and Yates (1996) successfully demonstrated that
making people accountable for a judgment procedure was superior to the method of
making them accountable for the outcome of the judgment. In this study, participants had
to make a probability judgment regarding the likelihood that an individual held a particular
attitude, based on background information about the individual. Participants accountable
for their judgment procedure were told that they would later be interviewed to determine
why and how certain information was used to arrive at a probability judgment. Participants
accountable for the outcome o f the judgment were told that they would be given feedback
regarding the accuracy of their judgment (true values were known) and that the top five
performers would receive a bonus prize for accuracy. Although Siegal-Jacobs and Yates
defined process and outcome accountability in a different manner from this study, both
studies highlight the importance of different types of accountability. Future research
should further examine such subtle differences in the way types of accountability influence
decision making behavior. It is suggested that a stronger manipulation o f process
accountability be used in the future because the operationalization of process
accountability used here was somewhat weak. Either a more well-defined process could be
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utilized or, in the domain of problem solving, participants could be asked to justify their
solutions by explaining what information they used to generate a solution and why they
used the information that they did.
It is especially interesting to note that accountability exerted no effect on solution
quantity. Given that accountability was the only variable manipulation that was verified by
actual behavior, there can be no doubt about the effect of the manipulation. Despite the
labor involved in providing written justification for a list of solutions, accountable
participants neither decreased nor increased their solution quantity in anticipation of the
justification. It may be that individuals varied in their reactions, such that some people
focused more on providing a long list of solutions, whereas others focused on ensuring
that the list was justifiable.
An especially important contribution of this study is the evidence that identifiability
may moderate the effect of accountability on performance. In the presence of
identifiability, unaccountable participants generated a higher proportion o f resolving
solutions than participants accountable for either the outcome or the process. Typical
research on accountability includes both an identifiability and justification component. This
study suggests that the identifiability component is equally important to the justification
component for motivating behavior. The good news is that justification is usually
accompanied with identifiability in every day life. Justification with anonymity is probably
rare in the workplace, suggesting that the use of justification to improve performance in
such applied environments may prove to be a desirable practice.
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Whereas the task in this study has been described as highly involving, it is possible
that even this task is too artificial to generalize to the workplace. Though participants
were told, and it indeed was a reality that university officials were actually given the
solutions, there were no immediate consequences for the participants. However, it is not
clear how much consequentiality was perceived by the participants. Some people may
assume that being required to justify a decision means that there are automatically
consequences to the decision. The every day use of the word accountability may bring up
notions o f responsibility, consequentiality, ownership of outcomes, etc. Although this
study only used the word ‘justification’ and not ‘accountability’, other research should
address the different possible interpretations o f both the concept and manipulation of
accountability and how these interpretations may alter performance. In addition to
addressing the degree of perceived consequentiality, future research should consider the
role o f evaluation apprehension. Because participants did not have to face the people who
were reviewing their solutions, perhaps the social evaluation in this study may have been
too far removed. Or it is also possible that too much evaluation apprehension can act to
hinder performance, such that very high accountability or responsibility will cause
participants to be less creative or thoughtful. In these cases, less accountability may
enhance performance because there is less apprehension interfering with performance.
Future research should include both measuring individuals’ level of evaluation
apprehension and varying the situations to include more immediate and proximal, as well
as distal, evaluation.
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Accountability research has shown important differences in the effect of
accountability on performance as a function of the individual to whom participants are
accountable. Future research in problem solving should include contexts similar to the
work environment, where expected justification is more personal and generally requires a
face-to-face encounter and where decision outcomes are more immediate and personally
consequential.
Although no specific predictions were made regarding the effect o f identifiability,
responsibility, and accountability on solution quantity, it is nonetheless surprising that
there were no significant effects in any direction for any variable for solution quantity. One
possible explanation for these null results points to the solution generation instructions
given to all participants. Initial problem instructions asked participants to generate as many
solutions to the problem as they could. Whereas these instructions were intended to cause
participants to generate multiple solutions instead o f just providing one final solution, the
instructions may have caused all participants to focus on solution quantity, much like the
instructions often given for brainstorming. Other research on social loafing, however, has
shown that differences between shared and sole responsibility performance exist in spite of
brainstorming instructions. Harkins and Petty (1982) gave explicit brainstorming
instructions to all participants and still found that participants in the sole responsibility
condition outperformed participants in the shared responsibility condition in the quantity
of uses generated for an object.
Much o f the previous discussion indicated that more attention should be paid to the
solution generation instructions given in the future, given that these instructions may have
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the potential to moderate the effects o f many variables on solution generation. Instructions
to brainstorm, focus on quantity, or focus on quality should be manipulated instead of
used as a design constant because it is not clear whether instructions may serve to
motivate participants in differential ways, independent o f any other interventions.
In addition to the direct effects o f motivational variables such as identifiability,
responsibility, and accountability, future research must continue attempts to identify the
joint effects of these variables as well as direct attention to individual difference, task, and
situational moderators. Do people vary in their response to anticipated evaluation? Do
some people perceive accountability as a threatening, and therefore anxiety-producing,
influence? Do others perceive accountability as a challenge they aspire to meet? What
about individual differences in need for cognition, intelligence, and expertise? How do
these motivational variables affect individuals who have a proclivity to perform well in the
first place? How is performance affected by an important and highly involving task? How
does task complexity affect performance? Does it matter whether an individual is
accountable to a peer or to a superior? All o f these questions and many more must be
addressed if we expect to offer valuable contributions to the literature on motivation,
problem solving, and small groups and to advise practitioners interested in improving
problem solving performance within their organizations.
Clearly, the nature o f the interactions among identifiability, responsibility, and
accountability remain unclear. It is important to note, however, that this study does not
suggest that having more motivational influences is always better. Whereas one
motivational influence at a time may enhance performance, additional influences do not
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appear to have an additive effect. It may be that a moderate level o f identifiability,
responsibility, and accountability is required to maximize performance. Too much
responsibility and accountability may have the potential to induce high arousal and anxiety,
neither o f which facilitate performance, especially during difficult tasks. These variables
appear to interact in a complicated way, and an easy solution is not yet on the horizon.
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Appendix A
Parking Problem
It is difficult to find a parking space at UNO. There is approximately one parking space for
every two people on campus, and although this doesn’t sound too bad, anyone who has
tried to find a spot at 10 a.m. knows there is a problem. The park just south o f the
university provides additional parking spaces, but it is also filled during peak hours.
Although there has been talk o f building an access road to UNO to ease traffic congestion,
there is concern that increased traffic through the park would be dangerous for children. In
addition, large old trees would have to be cut down, and some residents have complained
that some of the charm of the park would be lost if a road was built. There are plenty o f
parking spaces available at Ak-Sar-Ben, but students who park there must take a time
consuming bus ride to campus. In addition, the university must run costly buses to and
from Ak-Sar-Ben even in the late afternoon when there is only an occasional passenger.
The university is sensitive to the complaints o f students and would like to solve the
parking problem at UNO, but state budget cuts have severely limited the funds available to
handle such matters. The university does not know what to do.
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Appendix B
Resolving Power (RPVParking Problem
Essential Conflict:
The goals of the university to maintain good community relations and live within
the university budget.
The goals of the students to have more convenient (hassle-free) parking so
students can get to class in a timely manner.
One side of the conflict (Either university OR student goals):
Rating
1
General RP-Solution doesn’t do a very good job addressing any aspects/facets of
the problem.
*Parking Problem-Solution addresses either subaspect (community relations vs
budget; or more convenient parking vs. timeliness) of one side -does not do a very
goodjob

Exemplar- Provide limousine service. (Could possibly be more convenient, but
not necessarily; definitely doesn’t consider budget, and may actually cause
problems with community due to traffic)
General RP Solution addresses one aspect/facet of the problem moderately well.
^Parking Problem- Two Possibilities:
1) Solution addresses either subaspect o f one side fairly well OR
2) Solution addresses both subaspects o f one side not so well
Exemplar Campaign for donations around Metro area (Addresses budget issues,
may harm community relations, and can’t be sure of how the student concerns
would be handled with this money)
3
General RP Solution effectively addresses one aspect/facet o f the problem.
*Parking Problem Solution addresses both subaspects (community relations and
budget OR more convenient parking and timeliness) o f one side well
Exemplar- Build parking lots in Elmwood park. (More convenient and less timeconsuming parking, but doesn’t take into account community relations or budget)
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Both sides of the conflict (Both university AND student goals):
Rating
4
General RP Solution seems to attempt to address one aspect/facet o f the problem.
^Parking Problem - Solution attempts to address one subaspect o f each sidedoes not do a very good job
Exemplar- Build a new parking lot. Charge students to help offset funding for
project. (Creates more parking, but not clear how convenient or time consuming;
addresses budget issues, but again not clear about community relations because it
doesn’t say where lot would be built)
5
General RP Solution resolves the conflicting aspects o f the problem moderately
well.
*Parking Problem- Two Possibilities:
1) Solution addresses 3 subaspects (2 university, 1 student OR 1 university, 2
student) fairly well
OR
2) Solution addresses all 4 subaspects (2 university, 2 student) not so well
Exemplar- We can avoid a peak time; get up early and go to school before class
begins, we can park anywhere. (Maintains community relations within budget; may
be reduced hassle, but is time consuming)
6
General RP Solution does a very good job resolving the conflicting aspects of the
problem.
*Parking Problem-Solution addresses all 4 subaspects o f both sides well
Exemplar- If the foundation of the present parking garage is sound or needs to be
made more fundamentally sound, then secure the present three floors and build
another three to four floors o f stalls. This could be a campus/community effort in
that faculty and students work as a team. For example, have Mannheim
Steamroller perform and donate the majority o f the proceeds into a trust. Have
several quality events and speakers and invest the monies into a secure program at
a reasonable rate. (Would provide more convenient and less time consuming
parking as well as maintain community relations within budget)
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Appendix C
Manipulation Check Questions
INDICATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING
STATEMENTS. PLEASE FILL IN THE NUMBERED CIRCLE ON THE ANSW ER
SHEET BETWEEN 0 AND 9 WHICH BEST REPRESENTS YOUR LEVEL OF
AGREEMENT FOR EACH STATEMENT.
1. The solutions and responses I have provided can be traced to me personally.
0------- 1------- 2--------3-------4--------5------- 6------- 7------- 8--------9
strongly disagree
strongly agree
2. When I thought of each of the solutions, I mentally justified each one before writing it
down.
0------- 1------- 2------- 3------- 4------- 5------- 6------- 7------- 8--------9
strongly disagree
strongly agree
3. The solutions and responses I have provided will be combined with solutions provided
by other students, to be reviewed by the university.
0------- 1------ 2------- 3------- 4------- 5------- 6------- 7------- 8--------9
strongly disagree
strongly agree
4. The solutions and responses I have given are anonymous.
0------- 1------- 2--------3-------4--------5------- 6------- 7------- 8--------9
strongly disagree
strongly agree
5. I alone have provided solutions to a particular problem, to be reviewed by the
university.
0-------- 1------2--------3--------4------- 5------- 6------- 7------- 8--------9
strongly disagree
strongly agree
6. In generating solutions, I thought about whether or not my solutions could be
defended as good solutions.
0-------- 1------2--------3--------4------- 5------- 6------- 7------- 8--------9
strongly disagree
strongly agree
Note. Questions 3 and 4 were reverse coded. Questions 1,3, and 6 were chosen to select participants.
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Appendix D
Task Instructions
All Participants
As you have just read, you have agreed to participate in a study to examine how
people solve real world problems. You will be asked to generate solutions to a problem
and complete seveial questionnaires. This should take approximately 45 to 60 minutes to
complete. You are guaranteed extra credit for this amount of time; however, should the
task take longer, credit will be given for this additional time as well.
Please read the following problem and write down as many solutions as possible for
the problem. Take as much time as you need to provide all o f the solutions that you can
think of. Please feel free to reread the problem as often as you like. When you can’t think
o f any more solutions, choose the solution that you feel is the BEST solution and circle it.

Low Identifiability, Shared Responsibility, No Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide for this problem will be strictly anonymous
and not traceable to you. They will be pooled with those of other participants who are also
responding to this same problem. All o f the solutions generated by the study participants
will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve this problem.

Low identifiability, Sole Responsibility, No Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide for this problem will be strictly anonymous
and not traceable to you. A series o f problems is being investigated, but you alone are
responsible for generating solutions to the following problem. Your solutions will be
considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve this problem.

Low identifiability, Shared Responsibility, Outcome Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide will be strictly anonymous and will not be
traceable to you. They will be pooled with those o f other participants who are also
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responding to the same problem. All o f the solutions generated by the study participants
will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve this problem. After you
have finished generating solutions, you will be asked to indicate the solution you think is
best and provide a written justification o f why you think chosen solution is the best one.

Low Identifiability, Sole Responsibility, Outcome Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide for this problem will be strictly anonymous
and not traceable to you. A series o f problems is being investigated, but you alone are
responsible for generating solutions to the following problem. Your solutions will be
considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve this problem. After you have
finished generating solutions, you will be asked to indicate the solution you think is best
and provide a written justification of why you think the chosen solution is the best one.

Low Identifiability, Shared Responsibility, Process Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide for this problem will be strictly anonymous
and not traceable to you. The will be pooled with those of other participants who are
responding to the same problem. All the solutions generated by the study participants will
be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt ot solve this problem. After you
have finished generating solutions, you will be asked to provide a written justification for
each o f your solutions.

Low Identifiability, Sole Responsibility, Process Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide for this problem will be strictly anonymous
and not traceable to you. A series of problems is being investigated, but you alone are
responsible for generating solutions to the following problem. Other participants are
working on different problems. Your solutions will be considered by UNO staff members
in their attempt to solve this problem. After you have finished generating solutions, you
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will be asked to indicate the solution you think is best and provide a written justification
for each o f your solutions.

High Identifiability, Shared Responsibility, No Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide will be pooled with those o f other
participants who are also responding to this same problem. We will ask you to record your
name so that your status as a student can be verified. All o f the solutions generated by the
study participants will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve this
problem.

High Identifiability, Sole Responsibility, No Accountability
A series o f problems is being investigated, but you alone are responsible for
generating solutions to the following problem. Other participants are working on different
problems. We will ask you to record your name so that your status as a student can be
verified. Your solutions will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve
this problem.

High Identifiability, Shared Responsibility, Outcome Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide will be pooled with those of other
participants who are also responding to the same problem. We will ask you to record your
name so that your status as a student can be verified. All o f the solutions generated by the
study participants will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve this
problem. After you have finished generating solutions, you will be asked to indicate the
solution you think is best and provide a written justification o f why you think chosen
solution is the best one.
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High Identifiability, Sole Responsibility, Outcome Accountability
A series o f problems is being investigated, but you alone are responsible for
generating solutions to the following problem. Other students are working on different
problems. We will ask you to record your name so that your status as a student can be
verified. Your solutions will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve
this problem. After you have finished generating solutions, you will be asked to indicate
the solution you think is best and provide a written justification of why you think the
chosen solution is the best one.

High Identifiability, Shared Responsibility, Process Accountability
The solutions you are about to provide will be pooled with those of other
participants who are responding to the same problem. We will ask you to record your
name so that your status as a student can be verified. All o f the solutions generated by the
study participants will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve this
problem. After you have finished generating solutions, you will be asked to provide a
written justification for each o f your solutions.

High Identifiability, Sole Responsibility, Process Accountability
A series o f problems is being investigated, but you alone are responsible for
generating solutions to the following problem. Other participants are working on different
problems. We will ask you to record your name so that your status as a student can be
verified. Your solutions will be considered by UNO staff members in their attempt to solve
this problem. After you have finished generating solutions, you will be asked to indicate
the solution you think is best and provide a written justification for each of your solutions.
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Appendix E
Table 14
Secondary Main Effects Analyses for Quantity of Solutions Resulting from Tests of
Interactions

Source

n

SS

df

MS

Identifiability

.27

1

.27

.05

.82

Responsibility

7.53

1

7.53

1.44

.23

Identifiability

.05

1

.05

.01

.93

Accountability

32.12

2

16.06

2.73

.07

Responsibility

9.41

1

9.41

1.47

.23

Accountability

14.63

2

7.31

1.14

.33

1. Id X Resp

2. Id X Account

3. Resp X Account

90

72
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Appendix E (cont)
Table 15
Secondary Main Effects Analyses for Number o f Resolving Solutions Resulting from

Source

n

1. Id X Resp

77

SS

df

MS

F

£

Identifiability

.00

1

.00

.00

.98

Responsibility

2.74

1

2.74

1.20

.28

Identifiability

6.24

1

6.24

3.77

.06

Accountability

3.58

2

1.79

1.08

.34

Responsibility

1.90

1

1.90

.88

.35

Accountability

6.09

2

3.05

1.40

.25

2. Id X Account

3. Resp X Account

90

72
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Appendix E (cont)
Table 16
Secondary Main Effects Analyses for Proportion o f Resolving Solutions Resulting from
Tests o f Interactions

Source

n

SS

df

MS

Identifiability

.04

1

.04

.45

.51

Responsibility

.19

1

.19

2.42

.12

Identifiability

.93

1

.93

12.90

.00

Accountability

.42

2

.21

2.87

.06

Responsibility

.25

1

.25

2.75

.10

Accountability

.02

2

.01

.10

.90

1. Id X Resp

2. Id X Account

91

73

3. Resp X Account
s '
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Appendix E
Table 17
Secondary Main Effects Analyses for Best Solution Resulting from Tests o f Interactions

Source

n

SS

df

MS

Identifiability

2.98

1

2.98

1.81

.18

Responsibility

2.49

1

2.49

1.51

.22

Identifiability

5.83

1

5.83

5.01

.03

Accountability

10.88

2

5.44

4.67

.01

Responsibility

3.80

1

3.80

2.51

.12

Accountability

13.45

2

6.72

4.44

.02

1. Id X Resp

2. Id X Account

3. Resp X Account

91

73
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Appendix F
Three-wav Interaction Cell Sizes

Identifiability

Accountability by Responsibility

Low

High

No Accountability
Shared Responsibility

2

1

Sole Responsibility

3

1

Shared Responsibility

4

3

Sole Responsibility

5

2

Shared Responsibility

5

8

Sole Responsibility

4

3

Outcome Accountability

Process Accountability

/

